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Not Guilty as Charged: The Myth of
Mens Rea for Defendants with Mental
Retardation
Elizabeth Nevins-Saunders*
The notion that mens rea is an indicia of culpability runs deep in the
American criminal law psyche. For most defendants, a finding that they
had the requisite legal intent may be all we need to know to pronounce
them morally culpable. This is because most defendants - those of
average intelligence - enjoy a level of socialization, rationality, and
agency sufficient to be aware of social norms, to make a choice to violate
them or not, and to control their own impulses in doing so. But for
defendants with mental retardation, the state-of-mind element fails to
accurately signify a "guilty mind." Social science research makes clear
(and existing neuroscience research seems to support) that these
presumptions of consciousness, choice, and control do not apply to people
with mental retardation.In essence, then, for this population, all offenses
become strict liability offenses, where an intent inquiry becomes virtually
meaningless.
While the criminal law does make some allowances for differences in
cognitive capacity, it does so only in very limited circumstances, through
the doctrines of competency, insanity, and diminished capacity. As a result,
litigants must resort to crude perversions of justice to introduce evidence of
mental retardation. Finding no valid policy or theoretical justification
(apart from incapacitation)for this failure to adequately address the
disjuncture between actual culpability and criminal liability, this Article
offers a new approach to cases charging defendants with mental
. Copyright @ 2012 Elizabeth Nevins-Saunders. Acting Assistant Professor of
Lawyering, New York University School of Law. I am very grateful for helpful
comments and conversations from Doug Husak, Austin Sarat, Rachel Barkow, Jim
Jacobs, Randy Hertz, Robert Dinerstein, Tony Thompson, Erin Murphy, Adam
Zimmerman, Jussi Tapani, Anita Wu, and the participants in the NYU Lawyering
Scholarship Colloquium. Thanks are also due to NYU's Center for Research in Crime
and Justice, which supported me during much of this project. Andrew T. Meyer
provided truly phenomenal research assistance.
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retardation.Specifically, it proposes a new default rule, where nonviolent
cases against them would be presumptively dismissed. More serious cases
charging violent crimes could proceed to trial with the standard mens rea
requirements, but would require that any sentence imposed be the least
restrictive alternative necessary to accomplish an articulable sentencing
goal. This proposal redresses a major flaw in current criminal law
doctrine, one which unjustly permits a finding of guilty minds among
defendants whose true culpability may not be presumed.
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INTRODUCTION

It is no longer news that there is a significant and troubling overlap
in the population of criminal defendants and those with mental health
issues.' The recent proliferation of mental health courts, judicial
panels, and media coverage demonstrates that, after decades of
ignoring the issue, the criminal justice system - if not the criminal
law - is finally beginning to address the particular concerns that this
population poses to law enforcement, courts, and corrections
agencies.' People with mental retardation,' however, have been largely
overlooked in this wave of attention.4
Nonetheless, our prisons and jails are full of people with mental
retardation.' Definitions of mental retardation vary and are
' It is estimated that over 5% of the US population has a serious mental illness.
R.C. Kessler et al., The 12-Month Prevalence and Correlates of Serious Mental Illness
(SMI), in MENTAL HEALTH, UNITED STATES 1996, 59, 63 (R.W. Manderscheid, ed.,
1996). Among jail and prison populations, however, the figure is 16%. PAULA M.
DITTON, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SPECIAL REPORT: MENTAL
HEALTH AND TREATMENT OF INMATES AND PROBATIONERS 3 (1999), available at

http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhtip.pdf.
2 A decade ago, only a handful of mental health courts were in operation in the
United States; by 2007, there were more than 175. CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH
CONSENSUS PROJECT, COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS JUSTICE CTR., MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A
PRIMER FOR POLICYMAKERS AND PRACTITIONERS 1 (2008).
3 While the definition of mental retardation is the subject of much debate, it is
typically considered an intellectual disability that (1) originates before age 18, (2) is

characterized by significant limitations in intellectual functioning, and (3) is
accompanied by significant adaptive functioning limitations in a range of every day
social and practical skills. See AM. ASS'N ON MENTAL RETARDATION, MENTAL
RETARDATION: DEFINITION, CLASSIFICATION, AND SYSTEMS OF SUPPORT 36-37 (10th ed.
2002) [hereinafter 2002 AAMR MANUAL]; AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND
STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 41 (4th ed., rev. vol. 2000) [hereinafter

DSM-IV-TR].
4 For instance, a 2005 survey of 90 mental health courts (representing 80 percent
of the known mental health courts at the time) found that just 16 percent would even
accept clients with developmental disabilities. CRIMINAL JUSTICE/MENTAL HEALTH
CONSENSUS PROJECT, COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TSJUSTICE CTR., MENTAL HEALTH COURTS: A
NATIONAL SNAPSHOT 3 (2005). More generally, a significant shortage of programs
targeting this population persists despite the concerns of advocates. See generally,

James W. Ellis & Ruth A. Luckasson, Mentally Retarded Criminal Defendants, 53 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 414, 479-80 (1985) (finding insufficient mental retardation
rehabilitation programs in prisons); Jessica Jones, Persons with Intellectual Disabilities
in the Criminal Justice System: Review of Issues, 51 INT'LJ. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRIMINOLOGY 723, 729 (2007).
1 Most progressive advocates use the term "intellectual disabilities" instead of
"mental retardation" because of the stigma, datedness, and general disfavor with
which the term is viewed. See Robert L. Schalock et al., Perspectives: The Renaming of

Mental Retardation: Understanding the Change to the Term Intellectual Disability, 45
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controversial. Experts generally agree, though, that it is a lifelong
condition' which manifests before age 18 and is characterized by
significant limitations in intellectual' and adaptive functioning.' While
there is some dispute as to the precise rate at which this population is
involved in the criminal justice system,' there is no question that this
group is heavily represented or even overrepresented.10 Moreover, a
defendant with mental retardation tends to be subject to harsher
treatment than one without such a condition at virtually every step of
the criminal process: a defendant with mental retardation is more
& DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 116 (2007). The term "intellectual disability"
or "ID" is defined as a person with "significant limitations both in intellectual
functioning and in adaptive behavior as expressed in conceptual, social, and practical
adaptive skills. This disability originates before age 18." Id. at 118. Because the
criminal law typically uses "mental retardation," however, this is the nomenclature I
generally employ in this Article.
6 Cynthia J. Curry et al., Evaluation of Mental Retardation: Recommendations of a
Consensus Conference, 72 AM.J. MED. GENETICS 468, 468 (1997).
7 Although the assessment of IQ is one of the most controversial aspects of the
definition of mental retardation, its use persists, particularly as a necessary, but not
sufficient, way to differentiate among levels of retardation. See 2002 AAMR MANUAL,
supra note 3, at 25-27. According to the DSM-IV-TR, Mild Mental Retardation reflects
an IQ level of 50-55 to approximately 70; Moderate Mental Retardation reflects an IQ
level of 35-40 to 50-55; Severe Mental Retardation reflects an IQ level of 20-25 to 3540, and Profound Retardation reflects an IQ level below 20-25. DSM-IV-TR, supra
note 3, at 41-42.
8 Adaptive functioning "refers to how effectively individuals cope with common
life demands and how well they meet the standards of personal independence" relative
to their peers. See DSM-IV-TR, supra note 3, at 42.
9 There is no consensus as to the number of individuals in the criminal justice
system who have some degree of mental retardation. One estimate suggests that least
2% and as many as 40% of offenders may have intellectual disabilities. Jones, supra
note 4, at 724. There is not even consensus as to the proportion of people with
intellectual disabilities among incarcerated populations, although a 1992 survey of
state and federal prison administrators reported that approximately 4.2 percent of
inmates were mentally retarded and an additional 10.7 percent had learning
disabilities. Lewis Veneziano & Carol Veneziano, Disabled Inmates, in ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF AMERICAN PRISONS 157, 159 tbl.2 (Marilyn D. McShane & Frank P. Williams, Ill
eds., 1996); see also Robert Dinerstein, The Criminal justice System and Mental
Retardation: Defendants and Victims, 97 AM. J. MENTAL RETARDATION 715, 716 (1993)
(book review) ("[Tihere are virtually no reliable data on the number of inmates with
mental retardation in local jails, where arrestees and those convicted of misdemeanors
would normally be housed, let alone data on all arrestees . . . .").
10 Dorothy M. Griffiths, Peggy Taillon-Wasmund & Debra Smith, Offenders Who
Have a Developmental Disability, in DUAL DIAGNOSIS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MENTAL
HEALTH NEEDS OF PERSONS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 387, 390 (Dorothy M.
Griffiths et al. eds., 2002) (citation omitted) ("[Pleople with developmental
disabilities are overrepresented in the criminal justice system, despite the fact that
their crimes are of much less severity.").
INTELL.
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likely to be arrested, more likely to be held pending trial, more likely
to be convicted, more likely to receive longer sentences, and more
likely to be abused during incarceration.n This treatment occurs
despite the fact that social science and neuroscience research1 2
demonstrates -

and the Supreme Court has acknowledged -

that

defendants with mental retardation are categorically less culpable than
their peers of average intelligence.13 Far from a life preserver keeping
this less blameworthy population above the swells of the criminal
justice system, mental retardation seems more like an anchor.
Defendants with mental retardation become enmeshed in the
criminal justice system in part because there are so few ways that the
law even acknowledges their disability. Criminal law primarily
addresses mental retardation or other differences in cognition through
the competency and insanity doctrines." Because these are exit ramps
from the criminal system (albeit likely on-ramps to the public mental
health system), these routes are deliberately narrow, allowing passage
only to the most extreme cases." In 2002, in Atkins v. Virginia, the
" See Kenneth L. Appelbaum & Paul S. Appelbaum, Criminal-Justice-Related
Competencies in Defendants with Mental Retardation, 22 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 483, 486
(1994); Carry L. Reichard et al., Law School Curriculum: Does It Address the Needs of
the Mentally Retarded Offender?, in THE RETARDED OFFENDER 226, 227 (M.B. Santamour
& P.S. Watson eds., 1982); Salvador C. Uy, From the Ashes of Penry v. Lynaugh: The
Diminished Intent Approach to the Trial and Sentencing of the Mentally Retarded
Offender, 21 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 565, 570 (1990).
" While the psychological and other social science research on people with
mental retardation is extensive, the neuroscience research is significantly more limited
and much less conclusive. See infra Part II.
13 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002); see also Uy, supra note 11.
" See Donald H. J. Hermann, et al., Sentencing of the Mentally Retarded Criminal
Defendant, 41 ARK. L. REV. 765, 768 (1988) (describing contemporary criminal justice
concerns about "a mentally subnormal defendant who is found unfit to stand trial or
criminally nonresponsible because of mental retardation"); see also Ellis & Luckasson,
supra note 4, at 453 ("[T]he public has fixed its attention on the insanity defense" but
it is "certainly correct" to call competence to stand trial "the most significant mental
health inquiry pursued in the system of criminal law." (citing ALAN STONE, MENTAL
HEALTH AND LAw: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION 200 (1975))).
" The insanity defense is raised in less than one percent of felony cases and is
successful in just a fraction of those instances. MICHAEL PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
THE INSANITY DEFENSE 108 (Carolina Academic Press 1994); see also Linda C.
Fentiman, Whose Right Is It Anyway?: Rethinking Competency to Stand Trial in Light of
the Synthetically Sane Insanity Defendant, 40 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1109, 1112 n.6 (citing
commentator's statement that "the incidence of cases in which the insanity defense is
raised is lower than the annual incidence of poisonous snakebites on the island of
Manhattan"). An estimated 2-8% of felony defendants are referred for competency
screenings. Jodi L. Viljoen & Patricia A. Zapf, Fitness to Stand Trial Evaluations: A
Comparison of Referred and Non-Referred Defendants, 1 INT'L. J. FORENSIC MENTAL
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Supreme Court announced the only current categorical rule
addressing defendants with mental retardation: they cannot be
executed.' 6 More typically, courts only consider the issue of a person's
mental retardation through isolated pockets of substantive or
procedural doctrine."
With few formal doctrinal tools available, players within the system
- prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges - have two choices.
First, they can resort to an 'array of stopgap measures designed to
prevent injustices from occurring. Among these is the use of
discretion, primarily in sentencing.' 8 Second, they can turn a collective
blind eye to the issue, pretending there is no difference between an
average twenty year-old defendant and one who functions more like
an eight year-old."
However, both choices can pervert just outcomes. The failure to
meaningfully and systematically address differences in cognitive
capacity (apart from competence or sanity) has repercussions not only
for people within the population, but also for the integrity of the
system itself. We should not rely on the discretion of gatekeepers to
determine which cases merit prosecution against defendants with
mental retardation. Sentence mitigation is an inappropriate substitute
127, 127 (2002). The vast majority of those evaluated - as many as 96% in
some jurisdictions - are found to be competent. See Bruce J. Winick, Criminal Law:
Reforming Incompetency to Stand Trial and Plead Guilty: A Restated Proposal and a
Response to Professor Bonnie, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 571, 578 (1995). As one
scholar put it, "The threshold of competence for defendants with mental retardation is
set relatively low in practice, and a substantial number of these defendants are, at best,
marginally competent." Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants with
Mental Retardation to Participatein Their Own Defense, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
419, 422-23 (1990).
16 See infra Part I1.B.
17 For example, mental retardation may be a factor in assessing a waiver of
rights
or the voluntariness of consent. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164 (1986);
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226-27 (1973). It may also be part of a socalled diminished capacity "defense," a legal doctrine most notable for its very limited
applicability. See infra Part III.A.3.
18 See, e.g., Sandra Anderson Garcia & Holly Villareal Steele, Mentally Retarded
Offenders in the Criminal Justice and Mental Retardation Services Systems in Florida:
Philosophical, Placement, and Treatment Issues, 41 ARK. L. REV. 809, 832-33 (1988)
(citing studies supporting claim that courts use discretion to consider mental
retardation at sentencing "even when a mental defense to a charge is not available");
see also Ballou v. Booker, 777 F.2d 910, 917 (4th Cir. 1985).
1
See Reichard et al., supra note 11, at 226, 227 ("'[A]ttorneys continue to defend
and prosecute retarded persons and judges continue to sentence them with little or no
recognition of the role of retardation in a defendant's case."' (quoting R.C. Allen,
Toward an Exceptional Offenders' Court, in 4 MENTAL RETARDATION 1, 3-7 (1966))); see
HEALTH

also Bonnie, supra note 15, at 429.
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for a lack of doctrinal tools addressing mental retardation. Novel
defense strategies that encourage juror nullification should not be the
only vehicle through which fact-finders can hear evidence of a
defendant's mental retardation. And, of course, simply disregarding
the difference that mental retardation makes does not make that
difference - or the unjustness of punishing such an undeserving
defendant -

disappear.

Given the disjuncture between actual culpability and criminal
liability for defendants with mental retardation, this Article rejects the
premise that mens rea is a fair indicator of culpability for these
defendants.2 0 I propose a new approach, which flips the assumption of
blameworthiness for this population. In my proposal, non-violent
offenses would be presumptively dismissed, and violent offenses
would be limited to the least restrictive sentencing alternative that
could satisfy specific goals of punishment.
While scholars in other disciplines have focused on the challenges
that defendants with mental illnesses encounter in and pose to the
criminal justice system, few legal academics have addressed concerns
specific to defendants with mental retardation outside the death
penalty context. Moreover, much like criminal law, legal scholars
approaching the issue tend to focus on just one aspect of the issue waiver of rights, competency, sentencing 2' - or briefly address a
range of such issues, often from a practice-oriented perspective.22
Virtually no one offers a comprehensive proposal specific to this
population, much less one that addresses the issue of culpability at the
outset of a case. Because the problems relating to defendants with
mental retardation are so systemic and because a piecemeal solution
20 By "mens rea" (also called scienter, state-of-mind, mental state, or criminal
intent), I mean what Dressler calls "narrow" or "elemental" mens rea: the state of
mind description that is included as an element in the definition of a criminal offense.
What I refer to interchangeably as "culpability" or "blameworthiness" is akin to
Dressler's "broad" mens rea, a concept of moral responsibility or blameworthiness. See
JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAw 118-19 (5th ed. 2009)

[hereinafter CASES].
21 See, e.g., Bonnie, supra note 15 (addressing competency of defendants with
mental retardation); Morgan Cloud et al., Words Without Meaning: The Constitution,

Confessions, and Mentally Retarded Suspects, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 495, 514 (2002)
(addressing confessions); Hermann et al., supra note 14 (addressing sentencing).
22 See, e.g., RONALD W. CONLEY & RUTH LUCKASSON, THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM
AND MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFENDANTS AND VICTIMS 55, 58 (George N. Bouthilet ed.,
1992) (addressing a range of issues related to representation of criminal defendants
with mental retardation); Diane Courselle et al., Suspects, Defendants, and Offenders

with Mental Retardation in Wyoming, 1 Wyo. L. REV. 1 (2001) (same); Ellis &
Luckasson, supra note 4 (same).
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even one which has more "pieces" than our current approach - is
ultimately insufficient, we need a broad response, one which applies to
nearly all criminal cases.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I analyzes the meaning and
locus of culpability in criminal law. Scholars and courts typically agree
that, in our system of justice, people should only be punished or held
accountable to the extent that they are blameworthy.23 Mens rea is the
initial signifier of moral blameworthiness, and it is critical to the
difference between addressing wrongs through criminal law and
addressing them through civil law.2 4 But, what do we mean when we
describe a person as culpable? At a minimum, culpability requires a
level of socialization, rationality, and agency sufficient to be aware of
social norms, to make a choice to violate them, and to control one's
actions in so doing.2 5 To say that a person has criminal intent, then,
implies that he has these capacities.
Part II argues that mens rea fails to capture the moral culpability of
most people with mental retardation. In particular, the psychosocial
and existing neuroscience literature reveals that people with mental
retardation do not typically demonstrate the consciousness, choice,
and control that underlie notions of blameworthiness. For many
people with mental retardation, all offenses become strict liability
offenses, where intent is irrelevant to the analysis of guilt. Rather than
serving as a narrow exception to the doctrine of mens rea, for
defendants with mental retardation, strict liability swallows the rule. A
real investigation into the state of mind and conduct of defendants
with mental retardation would be forced to reckon with features
common to this population, such as social isolation, low intellectual
sophistication, high vulnerability to manipulation, and significantly
impaired impulse control.
Part III considers, and rejects as insufficient, ways in which
substantive criminal law doctrine currently seeks to account for the
diminished culpability of defendants with mental retardation. This
includes the very restricted doctrines of competency, insanity, and
diminished capacity. The law's inattentiveness to mental retardation in
adults in determining their guilt or innocence not only skews
outcomes for particular individuals, but also distorts and undermines
the integrity of the criminal law itself.
-

See generally infra Part I.
Peter Arenella, Convicting the Morally Blameless: Reassessing the Relationship
Between Legal and Moral Accountability, 39 UCLA L. REv. 1511, 1527 (1992)
[hereinafter Convicting].
25 See infra note 31 and accompanying
text.
23
24
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Part IV explores the potential justifications for limiting our response
to this culpability gap and forgoing a more meaningful intent analysis,
such as administrative efficiency and public safety. However, I argue
that these concerns do not outweigh the problem of implying - and
punishing - moral responsibility where none exists, particularly for
nonviolent offenses.
Accordingly, in Part V, 1 propose a bifurcated approach to the
prosecution of defendants with mental retardation. For non-violent
offenses, a presumption of dismissal would apply. In more serious
cases, although a typical prosecution could proceed, any sentence
would be limited to the least restrictive alternative. This proposal
addresses the problem at its core, at the outset of the criminal process,
while still accommodating legitimate safety concerns.
It is worth noting upfront what this Article will not address. While
people with other cognitive disorders, mental illnesses, or substance
abuse issues may face many of the same issues as defendants with
mental retardation, they are not the subject of this Article. The
criminal law does not recognize these groups in the same way it has
already recognized defendants with mental retardation.26 Moreover,
too much variation exists in diagnoses, symptoms, treatments,27 and
possibly even blameworthiness 28 to assume that the same theoretical
framework should equally apply to these other classes of defendants.
Ultimately, I leave to others the task of finding commonalities - or
even differences - which might suggest additional classes of
defendants lack the culpability that the criminal law may attribute to
them. A wider movement toward a more meaningful intent inquiry
could bring us closer to legitimating the claim that criminal law only
punishes those with a guilty mind.

26 The most obvious such distinction is the per se exclusion of people with mental
retardation from the death penalty. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 316 (2002).
27 For instance, while many individuals with mental illnesses can take antipsychotic or other medication to minimize or fully address their symptoms, there is
no medication that people with mental retardation can take to ameliorate their
disability. See Part IV.E for more on the distinction between defendants with mental
retardation and others groups.
28 Some might argue that a culpable choice to reject available pharmacological
treatment for people with mental illnesses or to imbibe drugs or alcohol for people
with substance addictions - renders any resulting criminal conduct among these
cohorts blameworthy, even if such individuals otherwise may not have fully intended
their actions. See infra note 249 and accompanying text for more on this debate.
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MENS REA AND THE ELEMENTS OF CULPABILITY

The American system of criminal law is inextricably bound up in
issues of culpability and blameworthiness.29 It is virtually undisputed
that the law should not touch innocent conduct, but rather should
punish only culpable action. 3 0 As set forth below, both historically and
currently, the criminal law initially situates that culpability in the
element of mens rea.3 1 This section breaks down the assumptions
embedded in a finding of mens rea to help explain why such a
conceptual linkage is possible. In particular, asserting that a person
has the requisite intent to commit an offense suggests that the
individual has at least three discrete capacities:
A. Consciousness: subjective awareness and rational
understanding of social norms and potential risks (to
others' interests);
B. Choice: ability to rationally consider those norms and
determine whether to abide by or violate them, as well as
to be fully aware of one's actions; and
C. Control: the power to deliberately violate social norms and
exercise independent judgment.
Although the law may not have explicitly reflected the distinction
until the tenth century,32 mens rea has long marked the dividing line
between accidental and intentional harms;3 3 between the law's
selective power to punish and state-inflicted vengeance for conduct

29 See generally PAUL H. ROBINSON & MICHAEL T. CAHILL, LAw WITHOUT JUSTICE
(2006) (focusing on "desert" or "justice" as central justification for criminal justice
system).
30 See, e.g., Hermann et al., supra note 14, at 802 ("[D]efendant lacked the
culpability which is which is a precondition to punishment."); R. George Wright, The
Progressive Logic of Criminal Responsibility and the Circumstances of the Most Deprived,
43 CATH. U. L. REV. 459, 459-60 (1994) ("There is remarkable agreement that in
general, the legal system must not impose punishment unless the defendant is
blameworthy or bears moral responsibility for her act.").
3
See Stephen F. Smith, Proportional Mens Rea, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 127, 127
(2009) (arguing that mens rea is meant to demonstrate at least "modicum of moral
blameworthiness as a precondition to punishment").
3
Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31
HASTINGS L.J. 815, 830 (1980).
" As Holmes explained with regard to early legal claims being limited to harms
intentionally inflicted, "Even a dog distinguishes between being stumbled over and
being kicked." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw 3 (Dover Publ'ns 1991)
(1881).
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with harmful consequences;34 and between criminal law and a civil
system seeking to protect individuals without regard to morality."
Mens rea is now such a defining feature of criminal law that every
first-year law student learns that a "guilty act" (actus reus) is usually
criminal only if accompanied by a "guilty mind" (mens rea). 6
This connection between mens rea and culpability persists today.
Stuart Green defines culpability as "the moral value attributed to a
defendant's state of mind during the commission of a crime" or
something which "reflects the degree to which an individual offender
is blameworthy or responsible or can be held accountable."37 This
definition demonstrates the near perfect overlap between these two
concepts. Indeed, the Model Penal Code titles its section on mens rea
3 and mandates that every
"General Requirements of Culpability""
criminal offense include a culpability element unless a legislature
clearly and deliberately indicates its intent to do otherwise.
State and federal criminal codes also continue to include proof of
mental state among the required elements defining the vast majority of
criminal offenses, particularly non-regulatory crimes.0 While refusing
to hold that proof of some mens rea is a constitutional due process
3 See, e.g., Martin R. Gardner, The Mens Rea Enigma: Observations on the Role of
Motive in the Criminal Law Past and Present, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 635, 652 (observing
that when law historically focused on "compensating and buying off the feud"
between parties, it "likely paid little attention to niceties of culpability"); Robinson,
supra note 32, at 823-24 (arguing that, historically, liability was based on instinctive
impulse to exact revenge on apparent source of evil result).
" See Robinson, supra note 32, at 816 n.9 (citing A. KIRALFY, POTTER'S OUTLINES OF
ENGLISH LEGAL HISTORY 156, 158, 163-65 (5th ed. 1958)); see also Arenella, Convicting,
supra note 24, at 1527.
36 See Jeremy M. Miller, Mens Rea Quagmire: The Conscience or Consciousness of the
Criminal Law?, 29 W. ST. U. L. REv. 21, 21 (2002) ("Crimes require a mental state or
'mens rea' element. Everyone in law understands this." (emphasis added)).
37 Stuart P. Green, Why
it's a Crime to Tear the Tag off a Mattress:
Overcriminalizationand the Moral Content of Regulatory Offenses, 46 EMORY L.J. 1533,
1547-48 (1997).
3 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (West 2010).
3 See MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.02(1), 2.05(1)(b) (1985); PAUL H. ROBINsON &
MARKUS DIRK DUBBER, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE MODEL PENAL CODE 12-13, available at
http://www.law.upenn.edu/fac/phrobins/intromodpencode.pdf (explaining intent of
Code's authors to require clear legislative purpose excluding culpability element).
4
Although legislatures may choose to enact strict liability crimes with no mens
rea requirement, they typically do so primarily for so-called "public welfare" or
regulatory offenses. See Francis B. Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses, 33 COLUM. L. REV.
55, 56 n.5, 72-73 (1933) (coining term "public welfare offenses" and cataloguing
examples of such low-level, strict-liability crimes). More serious, mala in se offenses
(those that are considered inherently wrong or immoral), typically require some proof

of the defendant's moral culpability. See Arenella, Convicting, supra note 24, at 1527.
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mandate, the Supreme Court has made clear that a "vicious will"
element in any offense definition is no "provincial or transient
notion."" Scholars, too, have exhorted the importance of only
punishing those who are truly blameworthy and, accordingly,
"deserving" of public opprobrium.12 Offenses that are strict liability requiring an actus reus, but no mens rea - have been routinely
criticized in legal scholarship. 43
Despite this context, some have pointed more recently to an
evisceration of the intent element, or at least acknowledged that when
it comes to considering intent, most of the heavy lifting occurs in
sentencing." Indeed, at the sentencing stage, a judge or jury is
compelled to assess not only the offense committed, but also
aggravating and mitigating factors about both the offense and the
offender. In a wide-ranging inquiry, bounded only by statutory
sentencing ranges, the decision-maker may well take into account the
defendant's diminished culpability with mental retardation. But, at
best, this may be only one of the many factors that the judge or jury
weighs." An individual's culpability - or, more pointedly, his lack
thereof - may also be manifest in his affirmative defense to a charge."

" Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251 (1952).
" See, e.g., Smith, supra note 31, at 127 (arguing that federal mens rea doctrine is
designed to exempt all "innocent" or "morally blameless" conduct from punishment
and should also be used to prevent disproportionate punishment).
4
See, e.g., Sanford H. Kadish, Fifty Years of CriminalLaw: An Opinionated Review,
87 CALIF. L. REV. 943, 954-59 (1999) (critiquing trend toward "liability without
fault"); Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78
CORNELL L. REv. 401, 425-28 (1993) (outlining retributivist and utilitarian objections
to strict liability); Sayre, supra note 40, at 78-83 (arguing that strict liability should be
limited to offenses with "really slight" penalties).
1
See, e.g., Green, supra note 37, at 1548 ("Although the elimination or
diminution of the criminal intent requirement has become fairly commonplace
(particularly in the regulatory area), this diminution is nevertheless viewed by most
commentators as inconsistent with the moral underpinnings of the criminal law."); cf
Doug Husak, The Costs to Criminal Theory of Supposing that Intentions are Irrelevant to
Permissibility, 3 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 51, 52-54 (2008) (critiquing view of many moral
philosophers that intention is "irrelevant to permissibility," and asserting difficulty
inherent in reconciling such a view with substantive criminal law).
4
In recent decades, the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have aimed to reduce
judicial discretion in sentencing. See Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., The Death of Discretion?
Reflections on the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1938, 1940-44,
1946-47 (1988); see also Gardner, supra note 34, at 747-48 (arguing that
individualized determinations of defendant's "evil motive," background, and character
is open-ended speculation better suited to competence of judges engaged in
sentencing after determination of guilt has been made).
6 See Gardner, supra note 34, at 737-42.
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Compared with both of these facets of criminal law, mens rea tends to
focus more on the offender than the offense and is a more discrete
inquiry than sentencing.17
While mens rea may not be a precise index for the extent of
blameworthiness or the punishment to impose on a particular
occasion, it does indicate a threshold level of culpability."8 Further, the
theory and history underlying mens rea, and the credibility of our
justice system, demonstrate the import of establishing some level of
blameworthiness as part of the case-in-chief, long before sentencing.
As the Model Penal Code comments suggest with regard to the Code's
articulation of mens rea standards (and its implicit critique of strict
liability), "crime does and should mean condemnation, and no court
should have to pass that judgment unless it can declare that the
defendant's act was culpable.""
Consistent with the purpose of mens rea as a measure of culpability,
the mens rea inquiry should be meaningful. For most defendants,
mens rea does indeed signify the "moral underpinnings of the criminal
law," because its shorthand presumes a number of capacities critical to
moral (or immoral) decision-making on the part of a defendant.o I
refer to these as (A) consciousness, (B) choice, and (C) control, and
address each in turn below.
A. Consciousness
Two types of consciousness comprise the first part of mens rea. The
first is awareness of a legal or moral norm." The second is awareness
of the likely consequences of certain conduct - that is, how one's
behavior may affect or harm another person, object, or entity." Each
of these interpretations of consciousness requires underlying cognitive
" See Green, supra note 37, at 1548 ("Culpability reflects the degree to which an
individual offender is blameworthy or responsible or can be held accountable. It
characterizes the actor, rather than the act and its consequences.").
48 See Albert Levitt, The Origin of the Doctrine of Mens Rea, 17 U.
ILL. L. REV. 117,
136 (1922) (noting "lilf the mind of the criminal or sinner is guilty, the punishment
is greater than if his mind is not guilty"); see also Sanford H. Kadish, Excusing Crime,
75 CALIF. L. REV. 257, 260- 61 (1987).
4
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.05 cmts. at 283 (1985) (explaining reason for rule that

non-intent/strict liability offenses should typically only be considered non-criminal
violations).
30 Green, supra note 37, at 1547-48.
s' See Herbert L. Packer, Mens Rea and the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REV. 107,
108 (1962).
52 See infra notes 60-61 and accompanying text (elaborating on this form of
consciousness).
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or social skills and the criminal law presumes adults have a certain
level of competency in these areas.13 Taking the example of a
defendant charged with arson, I demonstrate how each of these types
of consciousness comes into play.14
First, while ignorance of the law is famously no excuse for failing to
comply with its terms, a person must have some awareness or
"notice"" of the social and moral codes to which he is subject before
he may be considered blameworthy for violating them. Some theorists
note, "For norms to have meaning, the actor must be able to
appreciate the prohibition."5 6 Rather than requiring that individuals
learn every code in the codebook, this element assumes that
individuals are at least familiar with principles of social engagement.
For our model defendant, such consciousness includes a general
understanding that deliberately setting fire to other people's
possessions is normatively "wrong" - morally, socially, and legally.
The individual may not understand that a law exists forbidding the
behavior or even why it is impermissible; but he should nonetheless
perceive it to be a punishable wrong.
Appreciating norms like this draws on particular cognitive and
social skills. For instance, an individual would need to understand
what it means to live in a culture shaped by norms and the importance
of abiding by norms generally. More specifically, she would need to be
able to learn, appreciate, and remember particular social mores and
expectations. 8 In addition to cognitive skills required to obtain such

5
The exceptions, of course, are adults who have been found not competent for
trial. See infra Part Ill.A.1.
5
Under the Model Penal Code, a person may be guilty of arson if he "purposely
starts a fire . . . whether on his own property or another's, and thereby recklessly: (a)
places another person in danger of death or bodily injury; or (b) places a building or
occupied structure of another in danger of damage or destruction." MODEL PENAL
CODE § 220.1(2) (1980).
* It is, in part, this lack of notice that some point to in criticizing strict liability
offenses. See Elizabeth Nevins-Saunders, Incomprehensible Crimes: Defendants with
Mental Retardation Charged with Statutory Rape, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1067, 1078-82
(2010); see also Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225, 228-30 (1957) (holding that
defendant could not be convicted for failure to register as felon where there was no
evidence of actual or constructive notice of statutory requirement to do so).
56 LARRY ALEXANDER & KIMBERLY KESSLER FERZAN, CRIME AND CULPABILITY: A
THEORY OF CRIMINAL LAw 17 (2009).
5 See Robinson, supra note 32, at 819-20.
51 See Theodore Y. Blumoff, The Problems with Blaming, in LAw, MIND, AND BRAIN
127, 131-32 & nn.14-17 (Michael Freeman & Oliver R. Goodenough, eds., 2009)
(suggesting higher level cognitive and volitional capacities required for making
morally responsible or at least "prudent" decisions).
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information (potentially including literacy, ability to comprehend
verbal instructions or ideas, and memory), a person likely needs access
to and participation in social networks that can transmit and reinforce
specific norms."
Apart from understanding general or specific social expectations,
individuals should also be able "to comprehend the consequences that
their actions will have on others" before they may be subject to
punishment.60 This second type of consciousness means that, whether
a person knows there is a rule against setting fires or that setting fire
to another person's property is morally wrong, the law expects all
adults to appreciate the likely injury they would cause by lighting
matches in a neighbor's garage and setting them atop an old collection
of comic books. Divorced from specific rules, this is the most common
type of awareness enshrined in the criminal law. The Model Penal
Code, for instance, focuses its culpability element on an awareness of
risk or danger that a particular outcome will likely occur.6 '
Again, such awareness assumes particular skills on the part of the
defendant. Cognitively, an individual would need to understand cause
and effect across a wide range of substantive areas. Applied to our
arson example, this means that the defendant would need to know
both what he is doing (lighting a match) and the probable effect of
lighting that match near the comic books (matches can create a fire;
dry paper can stoke flames; a small fire can grow into a big one; fire
can permanently destroy a building or other property; a person may be
in or near a garage attached to a home; etc.).
There is also an empathetic component to this kind of
consciousness. The notion of "harm" implies an awareness of others'
interests and how one's own actions might affect another person,
object, or entity. Closely tied to a consciousness of social norms, this
form of awareness could add emotional content to a basic
understanding of cause and effect (burning someone's stuff is not just
5
Paul H. Robinson et al., The Disutility of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 1996
(2010) (describing utilitarian theory that legal norms are transmitted and reinforced
through social networks).
60 ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 56, at 17 ("[Aictors must have substantial
capacity to empathize with other human beings and affectively to comprehend the
consequences that their actions will have on others before they can rightly be said to
violate a moral or legal norm.").
61 Specifically, the Code's culpability elements focus on awareness of risk of harm
to another. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(2) (1985); see also Robinson, supra note 32, at
816-17, 819-20 (explaining that conduct is "blameworthy" in the view of the Model
Penal Code when individual engages in conduct and is aware or should be aware of its
harmful consequences or risk thereof).
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against the rules, it is also likely to hurt someone) and a normative
judgment (that effect on someone else - the harm - is a bad thing).
Thus, even the baseline expectations of consciousness implicate a
relatively high order of cognitive and social development.
B.

Choice

Once a person appreciates the norms (or risk of harm) against
which his conduct is measured, the individual must rationally evaluate
the norm and the costs and benefits of violating it. "[Ciriminal law
presupposes that actors are rational actors who are capable of using
reason to guide their conduct. It also assumes that actors have the
capacity for self-reflection."" Implicit in this ability is the capacity to
act independently, without undue influence from others. While there
is a rather thin line between what I call "consciousness" and what I
call "choice," choice reflects the deliberation and decision-making that
occurs, at least in part, based on a particular consciousness or
understanding of rules and conventions. Choice designates the
intentional decision to comply with or disregard social and legal
norms, as well as the analytic process which precedes that decision.
The decision not to comply is, effectively, criminal intent, and it
explains why others refer to mens rea as "the mental state of
defiance." 63
The capacity to choose whether to undertake a particular course of
conduct is a quality that many scholars focus on when they argue that
mens rea is determinative of moral blameworthiness. In H.L.A. Hart's
terms, for instance, having this capacity is what defines a "choosing
being," a status where people are held accountable for their choices
and conduct.6 1 Such a theory of individual accountability only makes
moral sense if the individual has, indeed, made a conscious,
independent choice. 5
62 ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 56, at 17.
61 Green, supra note 37, at 1548 n.29 (citing JEROME HALL, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL

LAw 281-86 (1947)); see also Samuel H. Pillsbury, The Meaning of Deserved
Punishment: An Essay on Choice, Character,and Responsibility, 67 IND. LJ. 719, 744
n.95 (1992) (citing Jean Hampton, Mens Rea, in CRIME, CULPABILITY AND REMEDY 1
(1990)) (referring to "criminal intentionality as a kind of defiance").
64 H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 49 (1968); see also ALEXANDER &
FERZAN, supra note 56, at 55 (stating that without choice, there is no responsibility);

Claire Finkelstein, The Morality of Criminal Law: A Symposium in Honor of Professor
Sandy Kadish: The Inefficiency of Mens Rea, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 895, 895 (2000)
(discussing Kadish's theory of criminal law as mechanism for ascribing responsibility
and assigning blame).
65 See Francis Bowes Sayre, Mens Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 1004, 1013 (1932)
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Choice arguably involves a higher level of cognitive ability and
psychosocial skills than consciousness of norms. In their work with
adolescents, psychologists Elizabeth Cauffman and Laurence Steinberg
propose a helpful model of psychosocial factors that affect decisionmaking, including (1) responsibility, (2) perspective, and (3)
temperance.66 Although I consider temperance in greater detail in the
context of "control" below, responsibility and perspective are
necessary skills for thoughtful decision-making.
Some examples of cognitive skills that provide a foundation for
decision-making might include use of logic, comprehension of certain
facts (such as the relationship between cause and effect), and ability to
weigh costs and benefits.67 At the same time, psychosocial capacities
underlying responsibility include self-reliance, clarity of identity, selfesteem, independence, and work orientation (pride in the successful
completion of tasks)." Perspective requires the ability to consider
situations from different viewpoints and place them in broader social
and temporal contexts. This includes the ability to see short and long
term consequences and to take another person's perspectives into

account. 6 9
Choice also suggests that a person acts voluntarily, and not from the
coercion, manipulation or compulsion of another. In extreme cases,
affirmative defenses, such as self-defense, necessity, and duress may
preclude finding criminal liability on these grounds.70 However, the
baseline legal presumption is that defendants that engage in certain
("[W]ithout a free exercise of choice one can not be said to have a guilty mind.").
66 Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, (Im)maturity of Judgment in
Adolescence: Why Adolescents May Be Less Culpable Than Adults, 18 BEHAv. Sci. & L.
741, 745 (2000) ("These categories are not mutually exclusive, nor are they without
some cognitive elements. The ability to appreciate the long-term consequences of an
action, for example, is an important element of perspective, but requires the cognitive
ability to weigh risks and benefits, and is related to the ability to forgo immediate
gratification, which is an element of temperance.").
67 See id., at 743-44; Lita Furby & Ruth Beyth-Marom, Risk Taking in Adolescence:
A Decision-Making Perspective, 12 DEVELOPMENTAL REv. 1, 11 (1992) (including ability
to generate options and assess value and probability of those options among steps in
normative model of decision-making); see also Marilyn Jacobs Quadrel, Baruch
Fischhoff & Wendy Davis, Adolescent (In)vulnerability,48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 102, 104
(1993) (discussing misunderstanding of facts as partial justification for teen risktaking behavior). While these studies focused on adolescents, they found no major
cognitive differences between adults and teenagers, at least for those fifteen and older.
66 Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 66, at 747-48.
69 See id. at 745.
7
See Steven J. Mulroy, The Duress Defense's Uncharted Terrain: Applying it to
Murder, Felony Murder, and the Mentally Retarded Defendant, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 159,
162-63 (2006).
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conduct with the required mens rea have the moral and intellectual
agency sufficient to hold them responsible for their behavior.'
C.

Control

Finally, a truly culpable person not only chooses to behave in a
certain anti-social way, but also executes that decision with intention.
More than just engaging in the conduct itself, the control element of
mens rea refers to the state of mind underlying the move from thought
to action, so that the action is deliberate. Criminal law requires "a
level of socialization and, except for those who fit extreme and
narrowly defined exceptions such as the insanity defense, a level of
intelligence, rationality, and capacity to act otherwise."72 Therefore,
punishable conduct cannot be accidental, inadvertent, or arising from
an impulse that the defendant cannot control. In Cauffman and
Steinberg's terminology, this aspect of control is "temperance," a term
which represents a person's impulse control, ability to evaluate
situations before acting, and self-restraint from aggressive behavior."
The Supreme Court has also linked self-control to culpability, finding
that an inability to control one's actions can make a person less
deserving of punishment."
While it is possible, and important, to unpack the content and
capacities which underlie mens rea, it is also risky. In exposing the
gravity of the load we ask mens rea to bear in contrast to the ease with
which it is typically dispatched in criminal cases, we may call into
question more broadly the assumption of culpability it is meant to
signify." Some scholars critique criminal law's assignment of blame,
charging that it is based on a relatively flimsy account of moral
agency. Such a challenge to mens rea and culpability generally is,
however, beyond the scope of this Article. In fact, I assume that the
law's basic assumptions about intelligence, rationality, and capacity to

" See Arenella, Convicting, supra note 24, at 1522-23.
72 Peter W. Low, The Model Penal Code, The Common Law,
and Mistakes of Fact:
Recklessness, Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 548 (1988) (emphasis
added).
1
Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 66, at 748-49 (describing psychological
testing measuring "impulse control" and "suppression of aggression" in teenagers
versus adults).
1
See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (citing lack of
behavioral control as factor leading to diminished culpability among juveniles).
7
Cf. Smith, supra note 31, at 127 (referring to "traditional role" of mens rea as
means of exempting all morally blameless conduct from criminal liability).
76 Arenella, Convicting, supra note 24, at 1610.
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act (or refrain from acting) may be borne out in the population
generally, even if such attributes "simply may not in fact be true of a
given offender." 7 Yet, as I argue in the next Part, these assumptions
are ill-founded across the class of defendants with mental retardation.
II.

APPLYING THE MENS REA AssUMPTIONS To DEFENDANTS WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION

Having broken down the meaning of culpability and the constituent
parts of mens rea in Part I, this Part considers whether people with
mental retardation are truly culpable, even where they fail to meet the
assumptions underlying mens rea. That is, in many, if not most, cases
involving a competent defendant with mental retardation, the
prosecutor may be able to provide evidence that the defendant acted
with the requisite mens rea to commit a particular offense. In the
arson example, for instance, to show that the defendant purposely or
recklessly engaged in criminal conduct, the prosecution may only
need to demonstrate that he started the fire by lighting matches in his
neighbor's garage and setting the matches down on or near a stack of
old comic books." But while a presumption of culpability may be valid
for defendants of average intelligence, a deeper examination of the
capacities and tendencies of people with mental retardation
demonstrates the gulf between this assumption and reality for
defendants with mental retardation.
Two forces work to undermine the overall culpability of defendants
with mental retardation: cognitive capacity and psychosocial
capacity." Deficits in brain function may partially explain why a
person with mental retardation cannot form mens rea for a particular
offense and, accordingly, should not be criminally liable." Moreover,
n Low, supra note 72, at 548.
* Elements for the offense of arson, including the element of intent, vary across
jurisdictions. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 220.1 cmts. 4, 8, & 9 (1980); id. at nn.57-6 3,
118-35.
9 Cognitive abilities include attributes such as information processing,
comprehension, logic, and abstract reasoning. Non-cognitive deficits might include
behavioral components, like impulse control, and social skills, such as social
reasoning, judgment, and vulnerability to manipulation or pressure of others. Lois A.
Weithorn, Conceptual Hurdles to the Application of Atkins v. Virginia, 59 HASTINGS L. J.
1203, 1208 (2008).
so See Dora W. Klein, Rehabilitating Mental Disorder Evidence after Clark v.
Arizona: Of Burdens, Presumptions, and the Right to Raise Reasonable Doubt, 60 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 645, 649 (2010) ("[Dlefendants may offer mental disorder evidence for
either or both of two purposes: to prove insanity and to raise reasonable doubt about
mens rea.").
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cognitive capacity to form mens rea alone should not necessarily imply
a truly culpable intent. Steinberg and Cauffman assert that immature
psychosocial and behavioral development should obviate culpability
among juveniles, and the same analogy could apply to adults with
mental retardation." Significantly, then, even where there may be
evidence that an individual has the requisite mens rea - for example,
a person took something that did not belong to him - he still may not
have the understanding or culpability that mens rea ostensibly
signifies.
One significant difference in making a claim about lack of
culpability among juveniles, as opposed to adults with mental
retardation, is the type of evidence available to support the argument.
Advances in neuroimaging technology enable juvenile advocates to
rely not only on psychosocial research regarding the behavioral and
cognitive immaturity of young people, but also on brainscanning."'
Brainscanning can reveal detailed images, activity, and development of
the juvenile brain.84 In exempting juveniles from life sentences
without parole for non-homicide offenses, recent Supreme Court
jurisprudence has relied in part on such neuroimaging advances in
finding juveniles categorically less culpable than their adult
counterparts.
" See Cauffman & Steinberg, supra note 66, at 758; cf. Ellis & Luckasson, supra
note 4 (describing historical analogy between children and adults with mental
retardation as both were presumed incapable of forming criminal intent).
82 ALEXANDER & FERZAN, supra note 56, at 742; see also Hermann et al., supra note
14, at 802 (arguing that program allowing defendants with mental retardation to
introduce evidence only to negate mens rea is insufficient to address broader
culpability issues); cf infra note 177 and accompanying text (citing authority for
argument that person may demonstrate legal mens rea without actually bearing real
culpability).
83 See, e.g., Brief for American Psychological Association et al. as Amici Curiae
Supporting Respondent at 9-12, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (No. 03-633)
(citing neuropsychological research to demonstrate that "the adolescent brain has not
reached adult maturity").
8 There are a range of neuroimaging technologies, but most relate to advances in
magnetic resonance imaging ("MRI"), which provides incredibly detailed pictures of
brain anatomy. Most pertinently, functional MRls ("fMRls") actually track images of
the brain while it is engaged in a particular function, providing data about underlying
"neuronal or metabolic activity." Teneille Brown & Emily Murphy, Through a Scanner
Darkly: Functional Neuroimaging as Evidence of a Criminal Defendant's Past Mental
States, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1119, 1127 (2010).
8 See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (citing past psychosocial
research about "the nature of juveniles" and noting that "brain science continue [s] to
show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds. For example, parts
of the brain involved in behavior control continue to mature through late
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For numerous reasons, neuroimaging research is not nearly as clear
for adult defendants with mental retardation. First and foremost, while
longitudinal studies demonstrate relatively consistent brain structure
no such
and maturation among children and adolescents,
consistency exists among people with mental retardation. Although
people in this cohort may share a diagnosis with relatively clear
cognitive and adaptive features, the etiology giving rise to their
intellectual disability is very diverse.8 ' Brainscanning studies on people
with mental retardation are generally rarer in part because of this
heterogeneity.8" Instead, researchers conduct studies in a limited way
on those diagnosed with a common genetic etiology, such as Down
syndrome89 or Fragile X syndrome. 90 This leaves the vast majority of
people with mild mental retardation out of the brain-imaging research
world, limiting the applicability of any common neurological finding
about this subpopulation for criminal justice policy purposes.
adolescence").
86 See Jay N. Giedd et al., Brain Development During Childhood and Adolescence: A
Longitudinal MRI Study, 2 NATURE NEUROSCIENCE 861, 861 (1999).
87 One study suggests there are over 750 known genetic causes of mental
retardation, accounting for approximately one-third of mental retardation cases.
ELISABETH M. DYKENS ET AL., GENETICS AND MENTAL RETARDATION SYNDROMES: A NEW
LOOK AT BEHAVIOR AND INTERVENTIONS 3, 5 (2000). Researchers have identified the
cause of mental retardation in just 25-40% of those with mild mental retardation, the
group most likely to be found competent in the criminal justice system. 2002 AAMR
MANUAL, supra note 3, at 32.
8
Doron Gothelf et al., The Contribution of Novel Brain Imaging Techniques to
Understanding the Neurobiology of Mental Retardationand Developmental Disabilities, 11
MENTAL RETARDATION & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RES. REv. 331, 331-32 (2005); see
also Manuel Martin-Loeches et al., Electrophysiology and Intelligence: The
Electrophysiology of Intellectual Functions in Intellectual Disability, 45 J. INTELL.
DISABILITY RES. 63, 63-64 (2001).
89 Down syndrome is the most common genetic cause of mental retardation,
though it affects only 1 in 730 births. Wayne Silverman, Down Syndrome: Cognitive
Phenotype, 13 MENTAL RETARDATION & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RES. REV. 228, 228
(2007).
90 Fragile X syndrome occurs when an individual has a mutation on a particular,
especially "fragile" (i.e., subject to breakage), gene on the X chromosome, such as the
FMR1 gene. PATRICIA AINSWORTH & PAMELA C. BAKER, UNDERSTANDING MENTAL
RETARDATION 23 (2004). It is the second most common genetic cause of mental
retardation, though it affects only one in 2,000 to 4,000 live births. Allan Reiss et al.,
Brain Imaging in Neurogenetic Conditions: Realizing the Potential of Behavioral
Neurogenetics Research, 6 MENTAL RETARDATION & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RES.
REv. 186, 186 (2000) [hereinafter Brain Imaging]; see Fumiko Hoeft et al., FrontoStriatal Dysfunction and Potential Compensatory Mechanisms in Male Adolescents with
FragileX Syndrome, 28 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 543, 543 (2007) (using fMRI, only on
subjects with Fragile X to reveal evidence of aberrant neural activity in performance of
executive function tasks).
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Even among testable genetic subgroups, however, the results of
brainscanning studies are very limited. 91 Studies may also be
constrained because research subjects with mental retardation struggle
to actually comply with requisite protocols." When tests are done,
they may produce limited findings, as even common etiology does not
guarantee consistent results - there may be significant variation in
how a genetic mutation affects different individuals.93 Finally, it is
often difficult for researchers to draw direct connections between
some brain abnormality and particular traits, especially those traits as
complex as intelligence."4
Despite these limitations, some developments in neuroimaging
studies confirm the social science studies regarding people with
mental retardation. In this Part, I challenge the validity of the mens rea
presumptions -

and, accordingly, the implication of culpability -

for

individuals with mental retardation in light of psychosocial and
neuroscientific research.
A.

Consciousness

As noted above, two different aspects of consciousness underlie the
association between mens rea and culpability: awareness of a legal or
moral norm and awareness of one's own conduct and its likely
consequences. 95 These two aspects of consciousness each entail
different cognitive and psychosocial skills, all of which may be
impaired in people with mental retardation.9 6
9
See Hoeft, supra note 90, at 544 (noting limited functional neuroimaging
studies among certain Fragile X populations); Katie R. Williams et al., Emotion
Recognition by Children With Down Syndrome: Investigation of Specific Impairments and
Error Patterns, 110 AM. J. ON MENTAL RETARDATION, 378, 390 (2005) (noting lack of
neurological studies on Down syndrome subjects to further elucidate psychological
testing results).
92 See, e.g., Curry, supra note 6, at 474 (noting that subjects of fMRI screenings
with mental retardation may require sedation); Gothelf, supra note 88, at 338
(suggesting that subjects with developmental disabilities may be unable to complete
typical cognitive tasks and may struggle to stay still in scanner for fMRI analysis).
" For instance, Fragile X affects males and females differently. Females tend to
have a broader range of symptoms, but are generally less affected than males. S.H.
Mostofsky et al., Decreased Cerebellar Posterior Vermis Size in Fragile X Syndrome:
Correlation with Neurocognitive Performance, 50 NEUROLOGY 121, 121 (1998); see also
Hoeft, supra note 90, at 544 ("To date, the only functional neuroimaging studies in
[Fragile X] are with females, most likely because of the challenge of imaging male
individuals with serious cognitive and behavioral problems.").
* See Martin-Loeches, supra note 88, at 72.
* See supra Part L.A.
96 See Shawn D. Anderson & Jay Hewitt, The Effect of Competency Restoration
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Cognitively, people diagnosed with different severity levels of
mental retardation may not always have the capacity to glean what
norms exist in a given community. First, one of the key features of
mental retardation is a limited intelligence. 97 Even those with "mild"
mental retardation who receive all necessary supports and training are
unlikely to achieve academic skills beyond the sixth-grade level."
Those with "moderate" retardation probably will not progress beyond
second-grade work.9 These cognitive deficits can limit even basic
skills or information acquisition.100 For instance, individuals with
mental retardation struggle with literacy, preventing them from
reading about or otherwise learning what rules they are expected to
comply with.'0 ' Some neuroscience evidence supports these findings.
In people with Down syndrome, for example, verbal processing
deficits have been linked to a smaller planum temporal and other
abnormal brain development issues.o 2
Social transmission of moral and legal norms is also unlikely to
occur in people with mental retardation. They rarely socialize with
peers of average intelligence, who may have greater access to and may
be likely to disseminate media and other messages about permissible
and impermissible conduct (however skewed it may be). 0 3 As some
Training on Defendants with Mental RetardationFound Not Competent to Proceed, 26 L.
& HUM. BEHAV. 343, 344 (2002) (noting that low IQ and poor adaptive functioning
are chronic disabilities for people with mental retardation).
9
See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
9 DSM-IV-TR, supra note 3, at 43.
99

Id.

See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (including "diminished ability
to understand and process information" and "to engage in logical reasoning" among
cognitive and behavioral impairments of people with mental retardation).
'o' See, e.g., Cloud et al., supra note 21, at 514 (explaining that an individual with
mental retardation who has been arrested may refuse phone call not because he is
uninterested in speaking with anyone, but rather because he may not remember any
phone numbers, may be unable to read a phone book, or may not even know how to
operate the phone).
102See DeborahJ. Fidler et al., The Down Syndrome BehaviouralPhenotype: Taking a
Developmental Approach, 12 DOWN SYNDROME RES. & PRACTICE 37, 41 (2008), available
(providing
at
http://www.down-syndrome.org/reviews/2069/reviews-2069.pdf
examples of behavioral profiles "rooted in the genetic and biological insult" that is the
genetic basis for Down syndrome).
103 See AINSWORTH & BAKER, supra note 90, at 114-15 (discussing potential for
limited social options for people with mental retardation and their resulting
dependence on family members or paid caregivers for recreation and socialization);
10

ROBERT PERSKE, UNEQUAL JUSTICE?: WHAT CAN HAPPEN WHEN PERSONS WITH
RETARDATION OR OTHER DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES ENCOUNTER THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 18 (1991) (indicating that adults with retardation often "fail to relate well with
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experts in mental retardation have put it bluntly: "Developmentally
disabled people typically lack social skills and -have not had the same
opportunities or peer group contact so critical in the development of
appropriate social behavior that normal individuals have had."lo
Even if taught the rules, a person with mental retardation may not
be able to understand'o' or remember'06 such information (much less
its social, moral, and legal value). As Miles Santamour, a former
consultant to the President's Committee on Mental Retardation,
explained, "[t]he majority of mentally retarded persons don't
understand why it's wrong to steal, but they will say it's wrong to
steal."'"1 Moreover, people with mental retardation may have difficulty
abstractingto8 or applying lessons learned on one occasion to a
subsequent context, making it difficult to confirm whether they have
actually learned and understood a rule.' 0 9
Evidence indicates that these deficits occur in criminal justice
contexts as well. For example, the inability to understand written and
unwritten prison rules manifests itself in a disproportionately high
rate of infractions among prison inmates with mental retardation."o
Similarly, studies show that people with mental retardation do not
fully understand the Miranda rights provisions."' Individuals with
mental retardation, and even those who tested just above the IQ level
defining mental retardation, cannot understand the Mirandawarnings,
those their age" and are likely to relate best to children or elderly adults).

F.

"4 SARAH
HAAVIK & KARL A. MENNINGER, II, SEXUALITY, LAW, AND THE
DEVELOPMENTALLY DISABLED PERSON 152 (1981).
1'0
See, e.g., John J. McGee & Frank J. Menolascino, The Evaluation of Defendants
with Mental Retardation in the Criminaljustice System, in THE CRIMINALJUSTICE SYSTEM
AND MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFENDANTS AND VICTIMS 55, 58 (Ronald W. Conley et al.
eds., 1992) (citations omitted) ("[Pleople with mental retardation encode information
in an extremely limited manner, and . . . lose[] information at a much faster rate" than
their non-retarded peers); see also Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 428 (describing
limited comprehension of "receptive" communications among people with mental
retardation, hampering their ability to understand questions, instructions, or
directions).
1'0 See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 428.
107 Dee Reid, Unknowing Punishment, 15 STUDENT LAw. 18, 21
(1986).
108 See ROSALYN KRAMER MONAT, SEXUALITY AND THE MENTALLY RETARDED 33 (1982).
10o See McGee & Menolascino, supra note 105, at 58 (citations omitted).
110 Garcia & Steele, supra note 18, at 835.
"I Cloud et al., supra note 21, at 501 ("[Mlentally retarded people simply do not

understand the Miranda warnings."); see also Caroline Everington & Solomon M.
Fulero, Competence to Confess: Measuring Understanding and Suggestibility of
Defendants with Mental Retardation, 37 MENTAL RETARDATION 212, 213 (1999) (citing
studies indicating "that significant deficits in understanding [Mirandarights] appear to
exist for this population").
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including both the meaning of individual words (even with simplified
vocabulary) and the concepts behind them."'
The second form of consciousness, an understanding of how one's
own actions might impact another, may also demand abilities that
most people with mental retardation may not possess. Even though a
person's lack of understanding may not approach the total failure to
appreciate her own actions that some insanity standards require,' 13 she
may nonetheless fail to fully appreciate her own capacity, conduct, or
impact."' For example, people with mental retardation may not
recognize the relationship between cause and effect. This may be
because they lack substantive education (they never learned or figured
out how fire travels), or because the idea of a series of interrelated
events in a chain is too complex and abstract for a person of limited
intelligence to comprehend."'
Not surprisingly, social situations reveal these deficits in
understanding one's relationship to others. That is, people with mental
retardation face difficulty anticipating or, subsequently, understanding
how their own actions could impact or harm other people.116 While
this concern is particularly relevant in a person's choice whether to
adhere to a particular norm or rule, as discussed below, it may also
have implications for the individual's understanding of whether rules
exist, as well as the scope and application of those rules to the
individual. "
Cloud et al., supra note 21, at 538-39.
See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985) (defining insanity as
circumstances where a defendant "lacks substantial capacity" to "appreciate the
criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law").
114 Reid, supra note 107, at 21 ("[M]ental retardation can interfere greatly with the
ability to . . . even understand the nature or consequences of one's actions.").
" See John Langone, Mild Mental Retardation, in MENTAL RETARDATION AND
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 113, 121 (2d ed. 1996) ("The major characteristic shared
by all . . . learners with mild to moderate disabilities is that they fall significantly
behind their general education peers in tasks that require learning using academic
112

113

skills .

. .

. [I]ndividuals with mental retardation are slow to learn new skills, do not

grasp concepts well at symbolic or abstract levels, are inefficient learners, and do not
readily transfer learned skills to new settings or when different materials are
required.").
116 See McGee & Menolascino, supra note 105, at 59 (explaining that people with
mental retardation have difficulty recognizing social cues, understanding the reactions
of others, or comprehending their own role in relation to another); see also Langone,
supra note 115, at 124 (suggesting that individuals with mental retardation tend to
lack self-direction and accordingly fail "to see the cause-and-effect relationship
between [their] behavior and subsequent events").
17 See Philip L. Fetzer, Execution of the Mentally Retarded: A Punishment Without
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Overall, the presumption of awareness that partially undergirds the
connection between mens rea and culpability simply does not hold
true for people with mental retardation. Because of mental capacity,
training, and socialization, defendants in this population are unlikely
to intuit, learn, or understand what society expects of them. Moreover,
they may be unaware of the full nature of their behavior and its
consequences.
B.

Choice

Even if a person with mental retardation knows about and generally
understands a rule, it is unlikely that she could make a meaningful
choice about whether or not to engage in particular conduct or to
violate a particular norm. Because of difficulties in the overlapping
areas of decision-making, moral reasoning, and independent thinking,
people with mental retardation may not be able to make a reasoned
choice.
In general, people with mental retardation struggle with the
analytical skills necessary for thoughtful decision-making. For
instance, they often lack problem-solving skills, particularly where the
problem requires some level of "formal thinking" or abstract
analysis."' Even people with mild mental retardation are typically
limited to concrete thinking or superficial categorization. 119 Thus,
people with mental retardation likely lack the ability to perform the
sort of cost-benefit analysis that people with average intelligence
might engage in before making a decision. 20 They also cannot engage
in "if-then" propositions or other mental predictions, strategic
Instead of employing novel or problemthinking, or foresight.'
Justification,40 S.C. L. REv. 419, 439 (1988).
118 AM. AsS'N ON MENTAL DEFICIENCY, CLASSIFICATION IN MENTAL RETARDATION 36-37
(Herbert J. Grossman ed., 8th ed. 1983) ("Mildly retarded people ... do not appear to
enter into formal thinking operativity and may have difficulty with concrete
operativity," and those with moderate mental retardation appear to end cognitive
development "at the preoperational-intuitive stages."); see also Jones, supra note 4, at
727 (referring to "cognitive deficits and limited problem-solving abilities" of people
with intellectual disabilities).
119 Appelbaum & Appelbaum, supra note 11, at 488 (providing example of mildly
mentally retarded individuals who can sort items based on appearance or functionality
but cannot engage in more abstract reasoning; adults classified as moderately mentally
retarded would only be able to sort based on appearance).
120See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 320 (2002) (finding deterrence rationales
inapplicable to defendants with mental retardation).
121 Appelbaum & Appelbaum, supra note 11, at 488 (citing Herman H. Spitz,
Intellectual Extremes, Mental Age, & the Nature of Human Intelligence, 28 MERRILL-
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solving techniques, individuals with mental retardation rely on
familiar behaviors or responses, even if those mechanisms have been
unsuccessful in the past.12 2
In addition to lacking analytical skills, this population has specific
disabilities when it comes to making moral decisions. A person with
mental retardation may lack the tools required to make the decision
that certain conduct is wrongful - a necessary step before he can
even reject the behavior in favor of compliance with a social or moral
norm.12 3 People with mental retardation may have a less mature or
complete moral development than others due to limitations in a range
of cognitive and psychosocial factors, including intelligence, limited
opportunity for interaction with others, exclusion from an enriching
environment, chronological age, and mental age. 124 These
circumstances have profound effects on an individual's ability to
develop and sustain a moral framework in which to evaluate the effect
of his own conduct, even if he is aware of community norms.12 1
This capacity to choose also requires a sense of agency and selfdetermination that many people with mental retardation lack, often
because of their longstanding relationship with and dependence upon
caregivers.16 Indeed, parents and other caretakers of people with
mental retardation may be so overprotective that their children
develop a so-called "functional retardation" even beyond their
intrinsic intellectual disability. Consequently, they fail to develop
initiative, social skills, and other mature behaviors because of a
learned fear of and inexperience with independence.127
This lack of agency is one of the scenarios that experts most often
point to in explaining the criminal involvement of people with mental

PALMER Q. 167, 167-78 (1982)).
122 R.S. Rueda & S.H. Zucker, Persuasive Communication Among Moderately
Retarded and Nonretarded Children, 19 EDUC. & TRAINING MENTALLY RETARDED 125,
125-31 (1984).
123 McGee & Menolascino, supra note 105, at 59-60.
124 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 429 n.78 (citing factors relating to moral
development).
125 See Courselle et al., supra note 22, at 23 (2001) (citing
McGee & Menolascino,
supra note 105, at 60) ("Full moral development takes into account the consequences
of an action not just for actor, but more abstract concepts such as how others will be
affected by the action.").
126 Elizabeth J. Reed, Note, Criminal Law and the Capacity of Mentally Retarded
Persons to Consent to Sexual Activity, 83 VA. L. REV. 799, 810-11 (1997) (noting that
people with mental retardation often lack assertiveness and decision-making abilities
because of dependence on caregivers).
127 AINSWORTH & BAKER, supra note 90, at 124.
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retardation.'"8 Indeed, people with mental retardation are frequently
trained to be -

and rewarded for being -

compliant with the wishes

and demands of others, including those with malicious or criminal
intent.'2 9 Relatedly, because of their low social status, people with
mental retardation suffer diminished self-esteem' and are eager to
conceal their disability and "pass" as a person of average
intelligence."'

Accordingly, even adults with mental retardation are highly
manipulable.' 3 2 This is consistent with some of the neurological
findings regarding individuals with Down syndrome."' People with
Down syndrome tend to experience high levels of atrophy in the
amygdala part of their brains, particularly as they age. 3 4 Research

128

See, e.g., JOAN

PETERSILIA, CAL. POLICY RESEARCH CTR., DOING JUSTICE? CRIMINAL

12 (2000) (explaining how interest in
pleasing authority often leads to false confessions of innocent suspects with mental
retardation); Hubert R. Wood & David L. White, A Model for Habilitation and
Prevention for Offenders with Mental Retardation, in THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM AND
MENTAL RETARDATION: DEFENDANTS AND VICTIMS, supra note 105, at 157, 162 (pointing
to "influence of ... peers" as factor leading to criminal justice system involvement and
noting defendants with mental retardation "are easily manipulated and often taken
advantage of by other more intelligent and/or more experienced individual. [They] are
more often followers and not leaders in breaking the law"); see also Everington &
Fulero, supra note 111, at 212-13 (pointing to strong desire to please others,
acquiescence, "outerdirectedness" (responsiveness to social cues from others instead
of personal problem solving), and vulnerability to pressure from others as partial basis
for frequency of confessions from defendants with mental retardation); Stephen
Greenspan, Functional Concepts in Mental Retardation: Finding the Natural Essence of an
Artificial Category, 14 EXCEPTIONALITY 205, 215 (2006) ("Illf there is a universal
quality that all people with mild MR possess and that defines its natural essence, it is a
vulnerability to social exploitation owing to an inability to understand other people,
especially when their motives are malevolent but disguised as benevolent.").
129 See Dick Sobsey & Tanis Doe, Patternsof Sexual Abuse and Assault, 9 SEXUALITY
& DISABILITY 243, 252 (1991).
130 See MONAT, supra note 108, at 8 ("The mildly mentally retarded are often
viewed as having very poor self imagery and self worth."); Jones, supra note 4, at 729;
Sobsey & Doe, supra note 129, at 253 (discussing damage of stigmatization to
individuals' self-image).
OFFENDERS WITH DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES

13'

ROBERT EDGERTON,

THE CLOAK OF COMPETENCE: STIGMA IN THE LIVES OF THE

192, 217-18 (1967) (stating that people with mental retardation
were "dogged" in efforts to pass as "normal," and struggled to "maintain [their] selfesteem" by hiding their "incompetence").
132 Greenspan, supra note 128, at 215.
13
J.D. Pinter et al., Amygdala and Hippocampal Volumes in Children with Down
Syndrome: A High Resolution MRI Study, 56 NEUROLOGY 972, 972 (2001); Silverman,
supra note 89, at 228.
13
Pinter et al., supra note 133, at 973.
MENTALLY RETARDED
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suggests that a dysfunctional amygdala can cause a person to be overly
trusting.13
Social science research also suggests that in both criminal and
noncriminal circumstances, the need for social acceptance makes
people with mental retardation prone to suggestibility and
acquiescence, regardless of whether they might actually disagree with
their interlocutor. 3 6 Thus, while individuals may appear to make an
affirmative, knowing act, their conduct may not be considered the
product of their own independent will. To fit in or please someone, of
higher status, for instance, they might agree to serve as a lookout, do a
drug buy, or participate in an assault. 3 1
Indeed, although much of criminal law regards these individuals as
perpetrators, in many circumstances it may be more accurate to
describe them as victims.138 In limited ways, the law acknowledges this
alternative characterization. That is, many states make it a form of
statutory rape for individuals to have sex with people whom they
know or should know have mental retardation.' The Supreme Court
has even drawn an explicit connection between this tendency toward
vulnerability and culpability, finding that susceptibility to
manipulation is a key reason that people with mental retardation
should not be subject to the death penalty.'4 0 As discussed below, the
lack of independence may further indicate non-culpability when it
comes to executing a particular decision or actually engaging in a

"I See Ralph Adolphs et al., A Mechanism for Impaired Fear Recognition after
Amygdala Damage, 433 NATURE 68, 68-69 (2005); Michael Davis & Changjun Shi, The
Amygdala, 10 CURRENT BIOLOGY R131 (2000).
136 See PETERSILLA, supra note 128, at 14; Everington & Fulero, supra note 111, at
213 (citing Carol K. Sigelman et al., When in Doubt, Say Yes: Acquiescence in Interviews
with Mentally Retarded Persons, 19 MENTAL RETARDATION 53, 53-58 (1981)) (providing
empirical data to suggest subjects with mental retardation will agree to even a
preposterous statement); Reichard et al., supra note 11, at 227 ("[Rletarded people
may be easily led and be open to the suggestions of others; they may be . . . unable to
answer questions; . . . and they may say what they think one wants them to say,
including confessing to anything, in order to curry favor.").
137 See, e.g., Ballou v. Booker, 777 F.2d 910, 911 (4th Cir. 1985) (suggesting that
defendant's confession concerning sexual assault occurred because victim's parents
urged him to make such a statement to police).
138 See Sobsey & Doe, supra note 129, at 253; see also MONAT, supra note 108, at 8.
"' Deborah W. Denno, Sexuality, Rape, and Mental Retardation, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV.
315, 397-403, 397 tbl.B (charting laws which include complainant's mental incapacity
as basis for statutory rape).
14
See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) (recognizing that mental
retardation can make person follow rather than lead and, thus, be, less culpable than
other offenders).
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course of conduct. However, this vulnerability first comes into play in
the choice to violate an established norm.
C.

Control

The final prong underlying the connection between culpability and
mens rea is the assumption that an individual acts intentionally and
thoughtfully on his choice to comply with or violate social norms.
People with mental retardation may suffer from poor impulse control
and vulnerability to undue pressure to act from others. Both of these
features of mental retardation make it difficult to claim that this
population is truly responsible for its own conduct.
In the juvenile context, both the social science and neuroscience
literature have documented the tendency among young people
towards limited impulse control.' Based in part on these findings, the
Supreme Court has deemed young people less culpable as a class and
constitutionally shielded them from the most severe sentences, such as
the death penaltyl4 2 and life without parole for non-homicide
offenses.'
Limited impulse control is also a key feature of mental
retardation." Accordingly, the Supreme Court has also acknowledged
that a lack of impulse control among people with mental retardation
partially accounts for their reduced culpability."' For those whose
mental retardation derives from a genetic condition known as Fragile
X syndrome, there may be neurological evidence related to this
feature.' 4 6 In both males and females with Fragile X, structural MRI
141 E.g., Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability, and the Adolescent
Brain, 305 Sci. 596,
597-98 (2004); Laurence Steinberg & Elizabeth Scott, Less Guilty by Reason of
Adolescence, 58 AM. PSYCHOL. 1009, 1013-14 (2003); Kim Taylor-Thompson, States of
Mind/States of Development, 14 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 143, 153 (2003) (pointing to
research on impulsivity among adolescents as potential cause of risk-seeking
behavior).
142 See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 568-69 (2005) (citation omitted)
(abolishing death penalty for juveniles in part because of their "impetuous and illconsidered actions and decisions").
143
See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2026 (2010) (striking down sentences
of life imprisonment without parole for juveniles convicted of non-homicide offenses,
based in part on evidence that they have impaired impulse control).
'4
See, e.g., Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 429 (citing social science research
suggesting impulsivity and poor impulse control as common traits of people with
mental retardation).
4
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 318 (2002) ("[Tlhere is abundant evidence
that [persons with mental retardation] often act on impulse rather than pursuant to a
premeditated plan, and that in group settings they are followers rather than leaders.").
146 See sources cited supra note 93 for more
on Fragile X syndrome.
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studies show an enlarged caudate nucleus, located in the basal ganglia
part of the brain. 4 1 Studies of lesions in the basal ganglia have shown
"disturbances in attention control, response inhibition, cognitive
flexibility, and goal-oriented behavior," phenotypes which frequently
also apply to people with Fragile X.'" Researchers have further
suggested that dysfunction in networks including the caudate could
contribute to deficits in executive function and impulsivity."' 9 And still
other neuropsychiatric studies have suggested that amygdala
dysfunction would contribute to diminished fear conditioning, which
in turn could increase impulsivity and risk taking.o As noted above,
while people diagnosed with Down syndrome do not have amygdala
dysfunction per se, they may have atrophied amygdalas, particularly as
they age. 1
Even where a person with mental retardation has the neural ability
to demonstrate impulse control, the individual may still lack real
control over her actions because of a susceptibility to pressure from
others. Given the research on this dynamic outlined with regard to
"choice," above, as well as the law's acknowledgment of its relevance
to culpability, we cannot assume that a person with mental retardation
truly controls -

and therefore should be responsible for -

her own

conduct.
Thus, the scientific (and social science) research makes clear that
people with mental retardation lack many of the capacities that endow
a finding of mens rea with an assumption of culpability. The question,
14

Allan Reiss et al., Neurodevelopmental Effects of the FMR-1 Full Mutation in

Humans, 1 NATURE MED. 159, 161 (1995).

"1 David Hess1 et al., The Neuroanatomy and Neuroendocrinology of Fragile X
Syndrome, 10 MENTAL RETARDATION & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RES. REVS. 17, 18
(2004) (citing M.T. Abrams & A.L. Reiss, The Neurobiology of Fragile X Syndrome, 1
MENTAL RETARDATION & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES RES. REVS. 269 (1995)); Michele
M. Mazzocco et al., The Neurocognitive Phenotype of Female Carriers of Fragile X:
Additional Evidence for Specificity, 14J. DEV. BEHAV. PEDIATRICS 328, 333-34 (1993).
149 See Hoeft, supra note 90, at 552 ("converging results" in Fragile X research
including morphometric imaging of increased caudate volumes indicate that
"abnormal development and function of the human [prefrontal cortex], striatum, and
fronto-striatal network . . .. could contribute to many of the cognitive and behavioral
manifestations of the syndrome including deficits in executive function, impulsivity,
hyperactivity, and some autistic behaviors."); V. Menon et al., Frontostriataldeficits in
fragile X syndrome: Relation to FMRI gene expression, 101 PROCS. NAT'L ACAD. ScIs. U.S.
3615, 3619 (2004) ("Disturbances of [] frontal subcortical circuits are known to
produce problems in executive function, motor programming, regulation of affect,
social behavior, impulse control, and flexibility in response to environmental cues.").
15
Justin S. Feinstein, et al., The Human Amygdala and the Induction and Experience
of Fear, 21 CURRENT BIOLOGY 34, 36-37 (2011).
151 See Pinter et al., supra note 133, at 973.
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then, is to what extent the law acknowledges this important difference
in its doctrines of criminal responsibility. As I argue in the next
section, there are a number of ways in which criminal law purports to
account for differences in cognitive capacity (including the
competency, insanity, and diminished capacity doctrines), but none of
these is sufficient to remedy the injustice of presuming mens rea
signifies actual culpability among defendants with mental retardation.
III.

THE STATUS

Quo: HOW

THE SYSTEM FAILS DEFENDANTS WITH
MENTAL RETARDATION

As I have suggested, a finding of mens rea is typically thought to
demonstrate that a defendant has crossed at least a threshold level of
blameworthiness. 15 2 A patchwork of other legal areas - namely,
insanity, competency, and diminished capacity arguably
supplement the mens rea inquiry into culpability insofar as they
provide some acknowledgment of the relationship between mental
disability and criminal responsibility. But they do so in a way that
tends to champion social control, public safety, and efficiency over
individualization and fairness. As set forth below, these doctrines are
insufficient responses to the lack of culpability among defendants with
mental retardation. This gap in the law results in perversions of justice
not only for individual defendants, but also for criminal law itself, as
litigants and courts seek to employ both sentencing and novel defense
strategies in lieu of substantive legal doctrines. Because the current
legal landscape fails to properly account for the difference in
culpability among defendants with mental retardation, in the final Part
of this paper, I propose a new legal avenue for addressing cases
involving this class of defendants.
A. At the Margins: Substantive Criminal Law Doctrines that Address
Mental Retardation
1. Competency
The competency and insanity doctrines are the law's primary answer
to defendants who claim that their mental disability makes them
nonresponsible for their otherwise criminal conduct. Accordingly,
152 Smith, supra note 31, at 127 (indicating that mens rea doctrine does "guarantee
a modicum of moral blameworthiness as a precondition to punishment"). Smith's
argument, however, is that such a baseline signifier of culpability fails to fulfill the
traditional role of mens rea in that it allows for sentencing that is disproportionate to
relative blameworthiness. Id. at 127-28.
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these two doctrines skim the least culpable individuals with mental
retardation - those with "gross" and "verifiable" disabilities - out of
the pool of defendants at some point in the criminal process.'
The competency doctrine does not specifically speak to culpability,
but it mandates a connection between criminal responsibility and
cognitive understanding. Under the Due Process Clause, defendants
who cannot rationally and factually understand the proceedings
against them and/or cannot consult with their attorney "with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding" are legally incompetent
and, therefore, ineligible for prosecution or sentencing.1 4 Those
whom a court determines (after psychiatric and/or psychological
evaluation) to be unlikely to regain competency are typically referred
to the jurisdiction of the public mental health system.'15 In such cases,
the facts of the alleged criminal offense may then be used to
demonstrate that they are too dangerous to remain free in the
community.'56 After hearings or even a trial, these defendants may face
involuntary civil commitment. But, they avoid criminalization and a
criminal record unless and until they gain competency (or have it
"restored")."' In part because incompetency can be considered a "get
out of jail free" card, its exercise is quite constrained." 8
Ultimately, when it comes to defendants with less severe forms of
mental retardation, the law of competency privileges public safety and
" See United States v. Moore, 486 F.2d 1139, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal,
J., concurring) ("The criminal law cannot vary legal norms absent a disability that is
both gross and verifiable .

. .

. A few may be recognized as so far from normal as to be

entirely beyond the reach of criminal justice, but in general, the criminal law is a
means of social control that must be potentially capable of reaching the vast bulk of
the population."); see also supra note 15 and accompanying text (providing statistics
on the rarity of defendants being found insane or incompetent).
' Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402, 402 (1960) (stating that findings of
competency require district judge to analyze defendant's ability to consult rationally
with his attorney); see also State v. Garfoot, 558 N.W.2d 626, 632 (Wis. 1997) ("[A]
defendant may be incompetent based on retardation alone if the condition is so severe
as to render him incapable of functioning in critical areas."). The assessment considers
the individual's status at the time of the legal proceedings and, therefore, may become
an issue any point in the process, up to and including sentencing. See Drope v.
Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 181 (1975).
155 JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING
CRIMINAL LAw 341-42 (5th ed. 2009)
[hereinafterUNDERSTANDING].
156 Id. The proceedings following the finding of incompetency, if any, occur
pursuant to a state's civil commitment law and may result in involuntary
hospitalization or other compelled treatment, services, or habilitation.
15
Id.
158 See supra note 15 and accompanying text on infrequency of incompetency
findings.
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prosecution over individualization and fairness. The competency
doctrine not only requires a near complete lack of awareness on the
part of the defendant,' but also stands as a perversely ineffective legal
response to people with mental retardation. First, it makes little sense
to presume that people with mental retardation might be "restored" to
competency over a period of weeks or months of treatment; their
cognitive condition is unlikely to change dramatically, if at all. 60
Moreover, because people with such intellectual disabilities typically
try to conceal their disability from others, they may evade efforts to
detect their incompetency.'
The difficulty identifying defendants
who actually meet the legal standard for incompetency is further
magnified because defense counsel typically lack the time, funding,
and specialized training required to effectively interview or even
identify clients with mental retardation.'62 Thus, a combination of
policy limitations on the doctrine, resistance among individuals to be
considered incompetent, and challenges in identifying mental
retardation results in an under-referral of these defendants for
competency evaluation.163

'" See Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 402 (1993) (acknowledging that
competency doctrine has "modest aim" and minimal requirements); see also Bonnie,
supra note 15, at 422-23, 429 (noting that "the threshold of competence for
defendants with mental retardation is set relatively low in practice"); Ronald
Schouten, Commentary: Training for Competence - Form or Substance?, 31 J. AM.
ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 202, 203 (2003).
160 Defendants with mental retardation can receive training to become competent;
however, their cognitive understanding is not likely to increase significantly. See Ellis
& Luckasson, supra note 4, at 424 ("[Llegal rules which focus upon the prospect of
'curing' mentally ill people may not address the condition of retarded people in an
appropriate or useful fashion."); see also Shawn D. Anderson & Jay Hewitt, The Effect
of Competency Restoration Training on Defendants with Mental Retardation Found Not
Competent to Proceed, 26 LAw & HUM. BEHAV. 343, 344, 349-50 (2002) (finding that
competency restoration is uncommon among defendants with mental retardation, and
that successful competency restoration typically requires relatively high IQ and
significant investment of time and tailored treatment). But cf. Dan Hurley, All I Could
Think is She's My Baby, She's a Lovely Girl and What Can I Do to Help Her?, N.Y. TIMES
MAG., July 31, 2011, at 28, 31 (suggesting that "with vigorous education and support,
many people with Down [syndrome] do far better than once thought possible").
161 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE INSANITY DEFENSE 240-41

(1994); Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 430.
162 See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 422-423 (explaining difficulties for
defense counsel in identifying and responding to clients with mental retardation).
163 Id. at 420-24 (hypothesizing reasons for this "pattern of under-referral").
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Insanity

The circumstances relating to the insanity doctrine are similar in
that insanity law provides an extremely rare way out of the criminal
justice system for defendants with mental retardation. This excuse
defense focuses on the culpability question.'" It considers whether a
defendant should be held criminally accountable despite having a
mental condition'65 that may impair her understanding of her conduct
and/or capacity for self-control during commission of the offense.166
While definitions of insanity vary widely across the country, legal
formulations often break down into two different prongs: a cognitive
prong ("I didn't know what I was doing" and/or "I didn't know it was
wrong")' 6' and a volitional prong ("I could not control my own
actions"). However, many jurisdictions do not require proof of both of
these prongs. 6 8 In most jurisdictions, an insanity acquittal results in
automatic commitment to a public mental health facility, up to and
including indefinite hospitalization.'
Regardless of the exact terms of a particular insanity law, the
doctrine is limited and has become even more so in recent decades.

164 Insanity is "the paradigmatic excuse defense." Russell D. Covey, Temporary
Insanity: The Strange Life and Times of the Perfect Defense, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1597, 1632
(2011). Excuses provide affirmative defenses based on the lack of blameworthiness of
the actor, as opposed to "justification" defenses, which validate the defendant's actions
based on policy grounds (such as self-defense). Id.
165 While the term "insanity" or, as it appears in some legal standards, "mental
disease or defect," may suggest that the defense applies only to those with mental
illnesses, mental retardation, itself or in combination with mental illness, may also
serve as the basis of an insanity defense. See, e.g., United States v. Jackson, 553 F.2d
109, 113-14 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("It is accepted in this jurisdiction that mental
retardation is a mental defect that will support an insanity defense.").
166 See Christopher Slobogin, An End to Insanity: Recasting the Role of Mental
Disability in Criminal Cases, 86 VA. L. REV. 1199, 1202 (2000).
16' The Supreme Court has separated the cognitive prong into a cognitive prong
and a "moral" one, placing elements such as the ability to distinguish between right
and wrong and the ability to understand the wrongfulness of one's actions into the
"moral capacity" category. See Clark v. Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 750 (2006) ("Seventeen
States and the Federal Government have adopted a recognizable version of the
M'Naghten test with both its cognitive incapacity and moral incapacity components.").
168The Model Penal Code's definition of insanity, for instance, allows for these
prongs to be argued in the alternative, requiring that an individual "lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to
conform his conduct to the requirements of the law" due to a mental disease or defect.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1985) (emphasis added).
169 See A. Thomas Elliott, Proceduresfor Involuntary
Commitment on the Basis of
Alleged Mental Illness, 42 U. COLO. L. REV. 231, 234-35 (1970).
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While public perception may be that the defense is commonplace,o
studies suggest that less than one percent of criminal defendants try to
use the insanity defense and, of these, only one-quarter use it
successfully."' A thirty-six state survey found an average of 33.4
insanity acquittals per state, per year, from 1970 to 1995, many of
them in misdemeanor prosecutions. 172
Most commentators identify the tipping point leading to the
limitation of the defense as the 1982 trial of John Hinckley, who
successfully employed it to obtain an acquittal after his assassination
attempt on then-President Ronald Reagan.17 3 In the political upheaval
following the verdict, many jurisdictions limited the reach of the
insanity doctrine. Congress, for instance, dramatically reduced the
doctrine's scope with the Insanity Defense Reform Act of 1984
("IDRA").17 4 Some jurisdictions abandoned the defense all together."'
Over twenty jurisdictions replaced or added to the insanity defense
with the more punitive verdicts "Guilty but Mentally Ill" ("GBMI") or

170 See Daniel J. Nusbaum, Note, The Craziest Reform of Them All: A Critical
Analysis of the Constitutional Implications of "Abolishing" the Insanity Defense, 87
CORNELL L. REV. 1509, 1512 n.9 (2002) (citing studies showing public's dramatic
overestimation use of insanity defense).
17' Laura Reider, Toward A New Test for the Insanity Defense: Incorporating the
Discoveries of Neuroscience into Moral and Legal Theories, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 289, 292
n.6 (1998) (citing study on use of insanity defense in eight states).
172 Carmen Cirincione & Charles Jacobs, Identifying Insanity Acquittals: Is It Any
Easier?, 23 LAw & HUM. BEHAv. 487, 487 (1999). A National Mental Health
Association report found that as many of 86% of insanity pleas occur in nonviolent

felonies and misdemeanors. NAT'L MENTAL HEALTH Ass'N, MYTHS & REALITIES: A REPORT
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE INSANITY DEFENSE 20-21 (1983).
173

See

RICHARD

J.

BONNIE ET AL.,

A

CASE STUDY IN THE INSANITY DEFENSE: THE TRIAL

OF JOHN W. HINCKLEY, JR. 121-27 (2d ed. 2000) [hereinafter CASE STUDY]; HENRY

J.

STEADMAN ET AL., BEFORE AND AFTER HINCKLEY: EVALUATING INSANITY DEFENSE REFORM

35-39 (1993); Russell D. Covey, Criminal Madness: Cultural Iconography and Insanity,
61 STAN. L. REV. 1375, 1427 (2009); Richard E. Redding, The Brain-Disordered
Defendant: Neuroscience and Legal in the Twenty-first Century, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 51,
98-99 (2006).
14 Under the IDRA, defendants are entitled to acquittal only if a "severe" mental
disease or defect rendered him "unable to appreciate the nature and quality or
wrongfulness of his acts." 18 U.S.C.A. § 17(a) (West 1984). At the same time,
Congress changed the Federal Rules of Evidence to prohibit experts from opining as to
whether the defendant possessed (or not) the requisite mens rea. FED. R. EVID. 704(b).
175 See, e.g., IDAHO CODE § 18-207 (West 2012) (eliminating the insanity defense
since 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-5209 (West 2011) (allowing evidence of mental
disease or defect only for purposes of negating mens rea); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-14102 (2011) (same); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-305(1) (West 2011) (allowing evidence
of mental disease or defect only for purposes of negating mens rea since 1983).

2012]

Not Guilty as Charged

1455

"Guilty but Mentally Retarded" ("GBMR")."* Unlike an insanity
verdict, these new verdicts constitute criminal findings, imposing
culpability and criminal sentences, notwithstanding a person's
inability to control himself or understand his own actions.17
This trend of limiting the insanity doctrine has continued long past
Hinckley's case. In 1993, for instance, Arizona halved its insanity rule,
eliminating the possibility for defendants to claim they did not
understand their actions.178 Such legislative changes also reflect the
public's mistrust of the defense because insanity acquittals seem to
unjustly absolve defendants who apparently engaged in criminal
conduct."' Ultimately, a number of factors have conspired to limit the
insanity doctrine's influence, including its legislative demise, its
relatively extreme diagnostic requirements, and even its lack of
popularity with the public.
3.

Diminished Capacity

Litigants who fail to qualify as either incompetent or insane have
been forced to rely on just one other doctrine to address their
difference in culpability during the case-in-chief: the diminished
176 STEADMAN ET AL., supra note 173, at 35-39 (summarizing state and federal
reform efforts following Hinckley case); see also Bradford H. Charles, Pennsylvania's
Definitions of Insanity and Mental Illness: A Distinction with a Difference?, 12 TEMP. POL.
& Civ. RTS. L. REV. 265, 268 (2003).
177 Practically speaking, a person found "guilty but mentally retarded" is usually
first sentenced in the criminal system without regard to his disability and only then
may or may not receive any special treatment or services related to his mental
condition. See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 155, at 365 ("The effect of a
GBMI verdict is that the convicted party receives the sentence that would otherwise be
imposed if she were found guilty; after sentencing, however, she may receive
psychiatric care in the prison setting or in a mental institution."). Alternatively, a
defendant found "guilty but mentally ill" may receive mental health treatment until
his mental health has rebounded, at which point he must serve the remainder of his
imposed sentence. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 12.47.050 (2004) (requiring individuals
found GBMI who no longer suffer from mental disease or defect to serve the
remainder of their sentence imposed).
171 In 1983, post-Hinckley, Arizona became one of the few states to put the burden
of proof on the defendant to prove his sanity by clear and convincing evidence. A
decade later, the alternative form of the insanity rule was eliminated: since 1993, a
defendant must prove that she "did not know the criminal act was wrong." ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 13.502(A), (C) (2012).
"9 Michael L. Perlin, "His Brain Has Been Mismanaged With Great Skill": How Will
Jurors Respond to Neuroimaging Testimony in Insanity Defense Cases?, 42 AKRON L. REV.
885, 899 (2009) ("The notion of any defense that allows criminals to claim they were
not responsible for acts that they admittedly did is rejected in total by a significant
percentage of the population.").
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capacity defense."so Diminished capacity has so many different
iterations in jurisdictions across the country that it is somewhat
difficult to define succinctly.1 81 Most commonly, however, courts and
commentators apply the Model Penal Code's definition: evidence of a
mental abnormality offered to show that the defendant was not
capable of forming the necessary mental state for a particular crime. 182
In other words, diminished capacity evidence serves to negate mens

rea.183

In theory, a doctrinal vehicle that permits evidence of mental
retardation to challenge or negate mens rea sounds like a fitting
response to the unjustified presumption of culpability inherent in a
finding of mens rea. If mens rea is the problem, why wouldn't the
diminished capacity doctrine suffice to give these defendants an
opportunity to introduce the relevance of their disability? Moreover,
diminished capacity provides a platform for such evidence where the
disability does not rise to the level of insanity. In reality, however,
there are two problems with relying on diminished capacity to cure
such ills for defendants with mental retardation: limitations on its
application in practice and limitations on its application in theory.
First, like tests for insanity and competence, the diminished capacity
defense has been so watered down - particularly over the past halfcentury - that it is a virtually useless defense for most people with
mental disabilities. Some states have banned diminished capacity
defenses altogether."' Other states only allow the defense in murder
180 While sometimes called a defense (here and elsewhere), it is more aptly
considered an issue of evidentiary relevance or sufficiency: an argument that the
government has not met its burden to prove the defendant had the requisite mens rea
beyond a reasonable doubt. See Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 393-94 (Colo.
1982).
18
See DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 155, at 367-76 (suggesting that there
are at least four different versions of diminished capacity and stating that "Iblecause
of the confusion pervading this area of the law, any generalization about it is just that
- a generalization subject to exceptions and inconsistencies").
182 Jennifer Kunk Compton, Expert Witness Testimony and the Diminished Capacity
Defense, 20 AM.J. TRIAL ADVOC. 381, 382 (1996).
183 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) (1985) ("Evidence that the defendant suffered
from a mental disease or defect is admissible whenever it is relevant to prove that the
defendant did or did not have a state of mind that is an element of the offense.").
Ambiguities in legal opinions and dicta make it unclear how many states actually
apply the Model Penal Code standard, but Dressler notes that the figure seems to be
between 11 and 15 states. DRESSLER UNDERSTANDING, supra note 155, at 369.
184 Arizona, for instance, prohibits evidence of a defendant's mental disorder for
anything but an insanity defense, including evidence to negate mens rea. Clark v.
Arizona, 548 U.S. 735, 742 (2006) (finding that Arizona's limitation on use of

evidence of mental illness comports with due process); see also CAL. PENAL CODE
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prosecutions. 8 Very few states permit the defense outside of specific
intent crimes.' 8 In Wyoming or Connecticut, for example, if a
defendant can prove that he could not have fully premeditated a
killing, he can use the defense to preclude a first-degree murder
conviction.18 ' However, the same defendant has no claim in an assault
or rape case because these are general intent crimes.'" Some states
also restrict the use of the diminished capacity defense to crimes,
which have "lesser-included-offenses;" therefore, negating mens rea
for murder means that the individual could still be guilty of the lesserincluded offense of second-degree murder. 89
While the genesis for such a narrow reading of the doctrine is not
universally agreed upon, much like insanity, the appearance of the
diminished capacity defense in high-profile cases seems to have chilled
public and political support for the doctrine. In particular, the use of
the defense in the 1979 murder trial of Dan White may have
contributed to public backlash against the diminished capacity
doctrine. In White's trial, despite his apparently cold-blooded killing
of then San Francisco Mayor George Miscone and fellow Board of
Supervisors member Harvey Milk, Dan White's diminished capacity
minimized his penal consequences.' 90
§ 25(a) (2010) (abolishing diminished capacity defense); Bethea v. United States, 365
A.2d 64, 89-90 (D.C. 1976) (same); Chestnut v. State, 538 So. 2d 820, 820 (Fla. 1989)
(same); People v. Carpenter, 627 N.W.2d 276, 283 (Mich. 2001) (precluding evidence
of mental abnormality to negate specific intent).
185 See Compton, supra note 182, at 392 n.96 (citing cases).
186 See, e.g., State v. McVey, 376 N.W.2d 585, 588 n.1 (Iowa 1985) (listing over a
dozen jurisdictions that limit diminished capacity defenses to specific intent crimes);
see also People v. Guzikowski, No. 206947, 1999 Mich. App. LEXIS 2339, at *3 (Ct.
App. Sept. 17, 1999) ("[D]iminished capacity is only a partial defense and it is only
available in cases where the prosecution is required to prove a specific intent.").
"8 See State v. Evans, 523 A.2d 1306, 1323 (Conn. 1987); Olsen v. State, 67 P.3d
536, 568 (Wyo. 2003).
1"
A general intent crime "requires only that a defendant 'intend to do the act that
the law proscribes.' " United States v. Gonyea, 140 F.3d 649, 653 (6th Cir. 1998)
(citations omitted).
18
See, e.g., McCarthy v. State, 372 A.2d 180, 182 (Del. 1977) ("[Plurpose of [a
diminished capacity defense] is . . . negating the requisite intent for a higher degree of
the offense" to prove "that in fact a lesser degree of the offense was committed."
(quoting C.T. Drechsler, Annotation, Comment note. -Mental or emotional condition as
diminishing responsibilityfor crime, 22 A.L.R.3d 1228, 1238 (1968))); State v. Sessions,
645 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah 1982) (noting that ". . . in most cases [diminished capacity]
reduces a defendant's guilt to a lesser included offense which requires only a general
intent").
190DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING, supra note 155, at 347; Miguel A. Mndez,
Diminished Capacity in California:Premature Reports of Its Demise, 3 STAN. L. & POL'Y
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Limitations on the doctrine champion social control over
individualized retribution, and they offer a clearly drawn line for
efficient enforcement. But the line makes little sense if the underlying
rationale for diminished capacity is that a defendant, while responsible
for certain impermissible conduct, should be considered less culpable
because of his mental disability."' The application only to specific
intent crimes or those that have lesser-included included offenses
becomes arbitrary."' The only real justification for such a limitation
seems to be a concern that if defendants charged with general intent
crimes can negate the mens rea element, the defendant might be
exonerated altogether. This may be an untenable result from a social
control standpoint,' but it is the only outcome that is theoretically
sound if there is to be any meaning to a state-of-mind requirement. 9 4
The second, more serious problem with the existing diminished
capacity doctrine is that even if diminished capacity permits evidence
to negate mens rea in all crimes (as it does in Colorado), it still has
limitations.1 5 The doctrine generally fails to account for the difference
in culpability between defendants with mental retardation who
demonstrate intent to commit a particular act (i.e., where the
prosecutor could technically "prove" the element of mens rea), but are

REV. 216, 218 (1991); JOHN RUBIN, ADMIN. JUST., MEMORANDUM: THE DIMINISHED
CAPACITY DEFENSE 1 (1992). For a fascinating account of how the media distorted the

diminished capacity defense in the case, see Carol Pogash, Myth of the 'Twinkie
Defense': The Verdict in the Dan White Case Wasn't Based on his Ingestion of Junk Food,
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 23, 2003, at Dl.
191See, e.g., State v. Correra, 430 A.2d 1251, 1253 (R.I. 1981) ("A defendant
claiming diminished capacity concedes his responsibility for the act but claims that, in
light of his abnormal mental condition, he is less culpable.").
192 See Compton, supra note 182, at 392 (stating that "courts have given no logical
answer to this dichotomy" of allowing evidence of mental abnormality to negate
specific intent, but not general intent").
9 Stephen J. Morse, Undiminished Confusion in Diminished Capacity, 75 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1, 13 (1984) [hereinafter Undiminished] (noting that "major
argument" against use of diminished capacity defense is "that its adoption will
endanger the public").
19 Courts have also justified limiting the diminished capacity defense as a way to
distinguish it from the insanity defense. State v. McVey, 376 N.W.2d 585, 587 (Iowa
1985). As the Colorado Supreme Court suggested in Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d
385, 394 (Colo. 1982), however, such an argument would suggest that legal sanity is a
"proxy for mens rea," which it is not.
9 Approximately 15 states and the Model Penal Code allow for evidence of
diminished capacity to be introduced to negate the mens rea of any crime. DRESSLER,
UNDERSTANDING, supra note 155, at 369-70.
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less blameworthy, and other adults who do not have mental
retardation.196
Negation of mens rea due to a mental abnormality is extremely rare,
making the diminished capacity defense of limited utility. 197 Thus,
because of his disability, a person with mental retardation may react
impulsively and excessively to provocation, may be goaded to act by a
manipulative peer, may not realize his own strength or the boundaries
of social interactions - but he may, all the same, "knowingly" or
"purposefully" take a swing at another.'98 It is not an accident or
conduct based on a hallucination or a delusion. A diminished capacity
defense would therefore offer no succor to the defendant charged with
even aggravated assault, despite it being a specific intent crime with
lesser-included offenses, if evidence existed that she had the requisite
mens rea. The fact that she might have acted criminally only because
of her mental retardation would not provide her any sort of legal cover
or acknowledgment of her diminished culpability. These limitations
render the current diminished capacity doctrine an interesting, but
insufficient means for addressing cognitive difference in criminal law.
B.

InterstitialPerversions

In lieu of legitimate doctrinal tools for addressing the wide swath of
defendants with mental retardation who are not at the extremes of
incompetency or insanity and who are unlikely to avail themselves of
diminished capacity, defense counsel and courts must seek options
outside the substantive criminal law. Sentencing is the most legitimate
mop used to clean up what may otherwise be a mess of doctrinal
196 This is essentially what the court found in People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911,
921
(Cal. 1966), where the panel overturned a first-degree murder conviction even though
defendant met all elements, including the requisite mens rea, because he was not
aware of a general obligation to act within the confines of society's laws. See also
Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Capacity: A Moral and Legal Conundrum, 2 INT'L J.L. &
PSYCHIATRY 271, 282 (1979) [hereinafter Diminished Capacity] (describing Conley

court as "Ulustify[ing]

a manslaughter instruction . . ." by ". . . impart[ing]

independent meaning into the concept of malice aforethought."). Notably, the law in
Conley is no longer valid. In 1981, the California legislature amended the state's
definition of "malice," abrogating the rule in Conley (and its progeny) that implied
malice encompasses a societal obligation, and rendering "express malice" and "an
intent to kill unlawfully" functionally the same. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 188 (West
2008).
197

See Arenella, Convicting, supra note 24, at 1524; Morse, Undiminished, supra

note 193, at 41-42.
198 See Part II for more extensive discussion of how mental retardation may affect
criminality.
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injustice. But it is an imperfect instrument in many regards, and it
does not prevent the initial spill. More problematic are tools such as
juror nullificationl 99 or unorthodox defenses.o Such responses may
threaten other criminal law pillars as advocates seek to address a
defendant's mental retardation in a legal system, which largely deems
the condition irrelevant.
1. Sentencing
Given the failings of the diminished capacity doctrine, some
scholars and judges addressing cases in this area urge replacing
diminished capacity with a sentencing scheme that can account for
differences in culpability.20' Sentencing has the great advantage of
being one of the few moments in the criminal process where decisionmakers are accustomed to individualized determinations, generally,
and on the question of blameworthiness, specifically. 2 As a result, it
is the last, and most prominent bastion of culpability mitigation.203

199Juror nullification "occurs when a jury - based on its own sense of justice or
fairness refuses to follow the law and convict in a particular case even though the facts
seem to allow no other conclusion but guilt." Jack B. Weinstein, Considering Jury
"Nullification": When May and Should a jury Reject the Law to Do Justice, 30 AM. CRIM.
L. REV. 239, 239 (1993).
200 For example, defense counsel might present the duress defense, which is

notoriously difficult-to-prove, in situations where others have compelled her client to
act, even where the basis for the defendant's conduct might not be objectively
reasonable, or where she is precluded from introducing evidence of the defendant's
mental retardation. See Steven J. Mulroy, The Duress Defense's Uncharted Terrain:
Applying it to Murder, Felony Murder, and the Mentally Retarded Defendant, 43 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 159, 167 (2006) (rejecting Sixth Circuit's exclusion of mental
retardation evidence and use of objective standard in duress case of United States v.
Johnson, 416 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2005)). Alternatively, defense counsel may present
any defense which offers the defendant a chance to testify, simply so that jurors could
observe any limitations for themselves.
201 See Peter Arenella, The Diminished Capacity and Diminished Responsibility
Defenses: Two Children of a Doomed Marriage, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 827, 848 (1977)
[hereinafter Diminished]; Morse, Undiminished, supra note 193, at 25-28.
202 See, e.g., Arenella, Diminished, supra note 201, at 863-65 (explaining that courts
are better able to tailor sentences to match culpability than juries); Gardner, supra
note 34, at 748 (arguing that individualized determinations of defendant's "evil
motive," background, and character is open-ended speculation better suited to
competence of judges engaged in sentencing after determination of guilt has been
made).
203Judge Leventhal noted that "[tlhe most that it is feasible to do with lesser
disabilities is to accord them proper weight in sentencing." United States v. Moore,
486 F.2d 1139, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Leventhal, J., concurring) (quoting MODEL
PENAL CODE § 2.09 cmt. at 6 (Tentative Draft No. 10, 1960)).
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This is particularly true in the death penalty context, where mental
disability is a required mitigation factor at sentencing. Some states
also include mental retardation as a mitigating factor for sentencing
purposes or exclude people with mental retardation from mandatory
minimums.20 s But even where state sentencing guidelines direct
decision-makers to consider particular factors, the trial court has the
discretion to determine the weight of any enhancement or
mitigation. 206 This ability to consider mental capacity as a mitigating
factor does not translate into a mandate to do so.
Moreover, relying on a judge or jury's discretion - particularly
unfettered discretion - does not guarantee that justice will be done.
Indeed, there may be reason to fear that jurors, or even judges, will
sentence more, rather than less, harshly because of the defendant's
mental retardation if they have the option to do so. 20 1 Some have even
argued that people with mental retardation are over-represented in the
criminal justice system because key players in the system, including
judges and lawyers, are unsure how to "deal with this population in a
professional manner. "208
Mandating a particular sentencing mitigation strategy based on
mental retardation, however, would not solve the problem of
diminished culpability among defendants with mental retardation.
Sentencing is an after-the-fact way of ameliorating the unfairness of
the current law; it still fails to allow defendants with mental

204 See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989). In the wake of Atkins, the
Court has continued to emphasize that "impaired intellectual functioning is inherently
mitigating," even in cases where there appears to be no nexus between the person's
mental retardation and the offense. See Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 287 (2004).
205 People v. Watters, 595 N.E.2d 1369 (111. App. Ct. 1992) (holding that trial court
had discretion to disregard mandatory sentence of incarceration for sexual assault
where defendant had IQ of about 60).
206 See State v. Blackstock, 19 S.W.3d 200, 211 (Tenn. 2000) (describing trial
court's discretion to mitigate sentence by providing examples of statutory mitigating
factors, including whether defendant's culpability was reduced due to mental or
physical condition and whether unusual circumstances of offense show that intent
was unlikely). Tennessee law requires judges determining a sentence to consider
evidence offered in mitigation but does not mandate that particular factors be
considered or particular weight be given to such factors. TENN. CODE ANN. H§ 40-35113, 210(b)(5) (West 1997).
207 See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) ("[R]eliance on mental
retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance the
likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the
jury.").
20. Jeffrey Schilit, The Mentally Retarded Offender and CriminalJustice Personnel, 46
EXCEPTIONAL CHILDREN 16, 19 (1979).
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retardation "doctrinal purchase" to argue for acquittal or mitigation.2 09
The consequences of a criminal conviction, including not only the
sentence, but also the trauma of the process and the collateral
consequences that may follow a conviction, cannot be undone because
a judge or jury shows mercy on a defendant at the sentencing stage. As
such, mitigation at sentencing will not sufficiently account for
diminished culpability in individuals with mental retardation.
2.

Ad Hoc Defense Strategies

The lack of a doctrinal avenue to legitimately introduce evidence of
mental retardation during trial means that defense counsel sometimes
must find other strategies for introducing facts about their client's
disability to a jury, even if it means putting forth an inappropriate
defense. An attorney may seek to put on an insanity, duress,
entrapment, or other defense where the facts otherwise might not lend
themselves to the theory simply because it gives him an opportunity to
get the evidence of a client's mental capacity before the jury. For
instance, to demonstrate that a client was more of a patsy or a victim
of her co-defendant's manipulation, defense counsel might present a
duress defense, even knowing that the high standard required of such
a legal justification might be insurmountable.o In essence, these
lawyers seek juror nullification based on mental retardation because
the law otherwise renders an individual's cognitive capacity largely
irrelevant.
Jury nullification, a phenomenon where jurors deliberately disregard
the law in rendering their verdict,"' may be one way to accurately
reflect community standards of justice or distaste for the criminal

Stephen J. Morse, Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility, 1 OHIo ST. J.
L. 289, 296 (2003) [hereinafter Diminished Rationality]. Identifying a similar
problem, Morse proposes a "Guilty But Partially Responsible" verdict - if
"defendant's capacity for rationality was substantially diminished at the time of the
crime, and ... that ... diminished rationality substantially affected his or her criminal
conduct." Id. at 299-300.
210 A duress defense generally requires that a person acted only because he was
coerced to do so by threat of force or actual force and "a person of reasonable firmness
in his situation" would have been unable to resist. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09(1)
(2001). Because the standard of reasonableness is an objective one, a person with
mental retardation might well have difficulty making the objective case that the
defense requires, but his counsel might nonetheless assert the defense. See United
States v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 464, 469 (6th Cir. 2005) (holding that "mental retardation
is not part of [the] calculus" in determining whether defendant acted under duress).
" BLACK'S LAwDICTIONARY 875 (8th ed. 2004).
209
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justice status quo, particularly as applied in a given case.2 12 However,
this is not the most efficient way to manage the injustice of
prosecuting those who lack culpability, and it may have unintended,
pernicious effects. Lawyers are not permitted to encourage jurors to
"nullify" the law directly.'
Moreover, some suggest that such
nullification is an affront to the rule of law and the need for
predictability in the criminal justice system. 21 4 To the extent that
people identify immorality or injustice in the criminal justice system,
for instance, they may be less inclined to comply with the law
themselves."'
More significantly, jury nullification is only available where judges
actually permit counsel to introduce the evidence in the first place.
Judge Jack B. Weinstein would have judges "exercise their discretion
to allow nullification by flexibly applying the concepts of relevancy
and prejudice and by admitting evidence bearing on moral values."
However, few judges exercise their discretionary muscle in quite this
way.2 16
Irreverent examples of zealous advocacy, including both novel
defense theories and sentencing, remain insufficient, if creative, efforts
to fill the lacunae left by traditional legal doctrines such as
competency, insanity, and diminished capacity. Collectively, these
legal responses outline the status quo for defendants with mental
retardation. And collectively, they beg the question as to why the law
disregards the challenges presented by so many defendants with
mental retardation.

212 See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification:
Black Power in the
Criminaljustice System, 105 YALE LJ. 677, 680 (1995) (arguing that jury nullification
is tool African-Americans should use to "prevent the application of one particularly
destructive instrument of white supremacy - American criminal justice - to some
African-American people); Jack B. Weinstein, The Role ofJudges in a Government of, by,
and for the People: Notes for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOzo L. REV. 1,
121-22 (2008) (noting that jurors may nullify convictions where they believe law to
be unjust or in conflict with their conscience).
213 Arie M. Rubenstein, Note, Verdicts of Conscience: Nullification and the
Modem
Jury Trial, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 959, 988 (2006) ("[Airguing for nullification is
forbidden by professional canons of ethics.").
214 Darryl K. Brown, Jury Nullification within the Rule of Law, 81 MINN. L. REV.
1149, 1151-54 (1997).
215 See Paul H. Robinson, Geoffrey P. Goodwin, & Michael D. Reisig, The Disutility
of Injustice, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1940, 2013-15 (2010) (demonstrating empirically that
"knowledge of systemic injustice can negatively affect not only compliance, but also
other relevant variables such as cooperation and moral credibility").
216 Weinstein, supra note 199, at 241.
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QUO

The psychosocial and neuroimaging evidence makes it clear that
people with mental retardation are not as blameworthy as other
criminal defendants. So why does criminal have such restrictive ways
of accounting for mental retardation? Put differently, why do
policymakers - abetted by judges, prosecutors, and defense counsel
- perpetuate the legal fiction that these individuals are equally
culpable? While there are a number of potential explanations for the
status quo, none suffices to justify the nearly wholesale rejection of
bedrock principles underlying the doctrine of mens rea.
A. Dangerousnessand Social Control
Preventing "dangerousness" may be the biggest concern of all;
acknowledging differences in culpability means that at least some
dangerous people will be free of legal consequences and supervision
simply because of their mental retardation. The criminal law often
seeks a difficult balance between social control and individual
liberties, and the fear that a whole class of defendants could avoid
taking (full) responsibility may tip the scales too heavily towards
individual liberties. Indeed, some might argue that a person with
mental retardation may be even more dangerous than an average
offender."' After all, releasing a person who has difficulty
understanding norms and applying rules in new situations sounds like
a recipe for recidivism. Nonetheless, other administrative and civil
procedures could be used to accommodate this interest in
incapacitation without compromising individual liberties through
unfair, criminal punishment.
First, criminal law is about more than simply social control or
management of undesirable conduct. For example, the law already
identifies legal categories of people who cannot be subject to criminal
processes and/or punishments, no matter how great the harm they
have caused may be: the incompetent and the insane. Our discomfort
with potentially absolving people from criminal responsibility explains
217 See, e.g., Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (noting that "reliance
on
mental retardation as a mitigating factor can be a two-edged sword that may enhance
the likelihood that the aggravating factor of future dangerousness will be found by the
jury"); Reid, supra note 107, at 22 ("Even when an attorney recognizes that mental
retardation may legitimately mitigate his or her client's responsibility for the offense,
it's difficult to convey that successfully to a jury."). But see Arenella, Diminished, supra
note 201, at 857 (noting that "an offender's mental abnormality may be an
aggravating, as well as a mitigating, factor if it makes him dangerous to society").
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why we have limited application of these categories to extreme cases,
namely, those who are very young and those who are very mentally
impaired.2 18 However rare these categories may be, they offer a
precedent of excluding certain people from criminal liability and
sanctions all together.
The context of insanity and incompetency is also instructive because
it provides a model for resolving some of those concerns related to the
dangerousness of people in this marginal population. In most
jurisdictions, when a court finds a person incompetent (and not likely
to regain competency) or legally insane, the individual is not released
to re-enter society.1 Rather, the person may be civilly committed (in
the case of incompetency) 220 or criminally committed (in the case of
insanity) to the public mental health system.' Whether an individual
is committed through a civil process or as an automatic result of a
criminal verdict, the commitment is meant to include supervision,
treatment, rehabilitation, and/or training. This is theoretically
designed to ensure that the person is not a danger to himself or others
due to his mental condition. Commitment may be involuntary and
may range from limited outpatient services to long-term inpatient care
in a secure facility. This likely depends on the severity of both the
person's condition and the likelihood of dangerousness. Such
measures would seem to address some utilitarian concerns for safety
of the community, up to and including the need for incapacitation and
victim protection.
B. Malingering
Skeptics often raise concerns that certain legal benefits that might
inure to people with mental disabilities should be used sparingly, if at
all, due to the potential for fraud or malingering.222 However, expert
evaluation can typically detect malingering. 23 In particular, the mental

218 See Part III.A.1-2 for a more extensive overview and critique of the doctrines of
incompetency and insanity, specifically with regard to defendants with mental
retardation.
219 Wayne R. LaFave, 1 SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW §§ 8.1, 8.4(a) (2d ed. 2011).
220 See Bruce J. Winick, Restructuring Competency to Stand Trial, 32 UCLA L. REV.
921, 933 (1985) ("Of those defendants found incompetent, the overwhelming
majority are committed to state hospitals for treatment.").
221 SeeJones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354, 366 (1983),
222 Atkins, 536 U.S. at 353 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (raising fear that Atkins decision
will inspire legions of defendants to "feign" symptoms of mental retardation).
223 See Steven J. Mulroy, The Duress Defense's Uncharted Terrain: Applying it to
Murder, Felony Murder, and the Mentally Retarded Defendant, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 159,
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retardation diagnosis requires not only IQ testing, but also ongoing
impairment in at least two areas of adaptive functioning, and a record
of onset prior to the eighteenth birthday.1 4 Chromosomal analysis,
while not necessary for a diagnosis, may also help establish or confirm
the diagnosis and, more specifically, its etiology.2 2 5
A "false negative" diagnosis of mental retardation likely occurs more
frequently than a "false positive." That is, people with mental
retardation tend to do everything possible to hide their disability or
pass as a person of average intelligence.226 Thus, while policymakers
may fear that people will fake their way out of legal responsibility, the
bigger concern is those who actually inadvertently "fake" their way
in.m People with mental retardation, not necessarily cognizant of the
severity of their situation, may not reveal their disability to parties like
their counsel, who, in turn, may not be trained to identify the
condition. Identifying mental retardation is also complex because a
proper diagnosis requires the attentiveness and cooperation of defense
counsel and others working with the defendant (such as family
members, law enforcement, or court staff) to notice and potentially
raise the issue with the court. 228 The difficulty in successfully raising
195 (2006) ("Most experts testify that retardation cannot be feigned.").
224 See Jonathan L. Bing, Protecting the Mentally Retardedfrom Capital Punishment:
State Efforts Since Penry and Recommendations for the Future, 22 N.Y.U. REV. L & Soc.
CHANGE 59, 89-93 (1996) (listing reasons there is no real risk of defendants faking
mental retardation diagnosis, including need for early identification, need to
demonstrate not only low IQ but impaired adaptive functioning, and procedural
hurdles such as burden and standard of proof).
225 See Curry et al., supra note 6, at 468-72.
226 See Bonnie, supra note 15, at 423 (referring to "well-documented tendency of
persons with mental retardation to conceal their disability"); Reid, supra note 107, at
20 (quoting mental retardation expert Ruth Luckasson's statement that people with
mental retardation "would do anything to cover up the fact they were mentally
retarded").
227 See Bing, supra note 224, at 90 (including defendant's interest in not being
perceived as having mental retardation among reasons that malingering is unlikely
issue).
228 See Appelbaum & Appelbaum, supra note 11, at 483-84. These same parties
may also have legitimate strategic reasons for not being forthright about a defendant's
disability. In some cases, for instance, defense counsel may wish to conceal a client's
mental disability to obtain a short sentence or other disposition rather than risk a
longer term civil commitment based on a finding of incompetency. See James K.
McAfee & Michele Gural, Individuals with Mental Retardation and the CriminalJustice
System, the View from the States' Attorneys General, in 26 MENTAL RETARDATION 5, 8
(1988); see also Wright Williams & Jean Spruill, The Criminal Justice/Mental Health
System and the Mentally Retarded, Mentally Ill Defendant, 25 Soc. ScI. MED. 1027, 103031 (1987) (finding that among defendants with mental illness found incompetent,
those also diagnosed with mental retardation served more time incarcerated in
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the issue of mental retardation, based on the need for multi-party
cooperation, the inclinations of the defendant, and the availability of
tools to disprove false claims, contradict overblown fears of
malingering.
C. Administration
Requiring a more intensive analysis of mens rea based on mental
retardation also raises administrative issues, such as identifying
population members and evaluating the diagnosis's effect on
culpability. Differentiating individuals who have mental retardation
from those who do not has become the first administrative concern in
the wake of the Supreme Court's decision in Atkins, which involved
the final penalty phase of trial.229 Assessing mental retardation at the
outset of the criminal process raises additional procedural problems.'
Certainly, an official diagnosis of mental retardation includes
extensive cognitive and adaptive testing by experts in mental
retardation (not only by psychiatrists).2 3' Moreover, age of onset
requirements may entail an investigation into school or other records
to demonstrate manifestation of the disability prior to age eighteen.232
Finally, to the extent that the government contests the finding, the
process can become even more complex and costly. 3 '
In addition, there are a host of conceptual and diagnostic issues,
which may lead to complex and costly litigation battles. Some of these
issues have been raised in the Atkins aftermath. Who gets to decide
the definition of mental retardation and what standard of proof will be
required? What happens to a person whose IQ score puts her just over
the line of mild mental retardation, but diagnosticians insist her
adaptive impairments make a mental retardation diagnosis

hospitals/jails than their incompetent peers without mental retardation).
229 Weithorn, supra note 79, at 1203-04 (identifying difficulty in clinical and
conceptual identification of mental retardation, and arguing that "the determination of
which offenders fall within the protected group is deceivingly complex").
230 Kelly Christine Elmore, Note, Atkins v. Virginia: Death Penalty for the Mentally
Retarded - Cruel and Unusual - The Crime, not the Punishment, 53 DEPAUL L. REV.
1285, 1338-39 (2004).
231 James W. Ellis, Mental Retardation and the Death Penalty: A Guide to State
Legislative Issues, 27 MENTAL & PHYS. DISABILITIES L. REP. 11, 14 (2003) (detailing
elements and expertise required for proper evaluation of mental retardation).
232 Penny J. White, Treated Differently in Life but not in Death: The Execution of the
Intellectually Disabled after Atkins v. Virginia, 76 TENN. L. REv. 685, 709-10 (2009).
233 Weithorn, supra note 79, at 1204 ("Much post-Atkins litigation has involved
disputes about whether a particular defendant is or is not 'mentally retarded.").

1468

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 45:1419

appropriate?1 4 What if the score is allegedly due to "the practice
effect" or some other contestable phenomenon? 3 5
It would be naive to dismiss these potential issues and the costs and
time needed to resolve them. But it would also be naive to think that
concerns and litigation battles that arise in capital cases will replicate
themselves with equal vigor in every non-capital case. This is
particularly true where the political and public safety concerns are far
less pronounced. People suspected of having mental disabilities are
routinely screened for competency evaluations and may be given at
least a tentative diagnosis of mental retardation at that time." In
relatively minor cases, or cases where the mental retardation diagnosis
is fairly apparent, prosecutors may well stipulate to such a finding.
The second administrative concern is determining precisely what
significance a mental retardation diagnosis has for a person's
culpability. In making his argument for a character-based system of
culpability, which would allow defendants "to contest ... their status
as blameworthy moral agents," Peter Arenella similarly recognizes that
such a change could come with significant administrative (and other)
costs. 37 This concern may really boil down to a suspicion about the
reliability of mental health testimony in general, particularly as it might
result in "unjust" freedom for "dangerous" individuals.2 38 Psychiatry
and psychology are not exact sciences, and a connection between a
diagnosis and culpability is a particularly complicated endeavor. On the
other hand, this is precisely the legal question that we ask judges and
juries to consider whenever sanity is at issue. Such determinations are
not beyond the reach of the whole criminal justice system.
None of these administrative concerns justifies ignoring the unfair
prosecution and punishment of people with mental retardation.
However, they should be factors considered in any proposal for
change and do inform the proposal offered in Part V.
234 See Ellis, supra note 231, at 13 (rejecting statutory reliance on particular IQ cutoff limits as "difficult to administer" despite their appeal for policymakers).
235 See Weithorn, supra note 79, at 1231 (describing the "practice effect"
phenomenon as increased score that may occur when the subject has sat through a
number of IQ exams and suggesting it, and other similar issues could affect who may
be considered a person with mental retardation in post-Athins litigation).
236 Moreover, some jurisdictions mandate
that court-appointed competency
evaluators have expertise in developmental disabilities. GARY B. MELTON ET AL.,
PSYCHOLOGICAL EVALUATIONS FOR THE COURTS 155 (Guilford Press 3d ed. 2007) (1987).
237 Arenella, Convicting, supra note 24, at 1616.
238 The government made a similar policy argument in its opposition to the
application of a diminished capacity defense to non-specific intent crimes in Colorado.
Hendershott v. People, 653 P.2d 385, 395 (Colo. 1982).
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D. ProsecutorialBurden
Another reason that we may disregard the disjuncture between
culpability and criminal liability for these defendants is that doing
otherwise might make the prosecutor's job too hard. The more the
government needs to prove about a defendant's intent, the more
difficult it is for prosecutors to indict a felony, to ensure that a
defendant can be detained pretrial, or to prevail at trial."' Eliminating
the mens rea requirement, as is the case with strict liability crimes, is a
prosecutorial piece of cake." By contrast, having to prove that a
defendant with mental retardation meaningfully had intent - not just
that he had the requisite "mens rea," but that he had the
consciousness, choice, and control to be legitimately culpable for his
conduct might untenably complicate the job of prosecutors and make
it harder to secure convictions.
Critics argue that requiring proof of more complex mens rea
requirements - anything beyond the Model Penal Code's "knowing"
and "reckless" standards - is at best unnecessary and at worst
impossible."' Determining whether a person drove "willfully and
maliciously" through a neighbor's fence, for instance, may require a
complex examination of the person's motivation for his conduct,
something that may be unknowable or unconscious. 242 The Code
defines culpability in relatively simple terms.4 It also provides basic
procedural protections, including notice, efficient use of charging
decisions, predictability of outcomes, and limited prosecutorial
overreaching.244 Notably, however, the standard of proof rises as the
defendant moves through the criminal process, from "probable cause"
upon arrest 4 5 to "beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction."2 6 This
Cf. Laurie L. Levenson, Good Faith Defenses: Reshaping Strict Liability Crimes, 78
CORNELL L. REv. 401, 404 (1993) (noting that strict liability standard "affords both an
efficient and nearly guaranteed way to convict defendants").
240 In the seminal case of Morissette v. United States, Justice Jackson acknowledged
this prosecutorial advantage: "The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the
requirement of a guilty intent is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to strip
the defendant of such benefit as he derived at common law from innocence of evil
purpose, and to circumscribe the freedom heretofore allowed juries." 342 U.S. 246,
263 (1952).
Gardner, supra note 34, at 652 (observing that before division between criminal
241
and tort law, focus was on "compensating and buying off the feud" between parties, so
law "likely paid little attention to niceties of culpability").
242 Id. at 714-15.
243 MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02 (1985).
244 Id. at 686-88.
24 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479 (1963).
239
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gives the government time to build its case, and allows it some leeway
to demonstrate the defendant's intent with weaker evidence in the
early stages of the case.
Ultimately, ease of prosecution is only one criminal justice value. It
must be weighed against a need to punish only blameworthy conduct.
While culpability may be further "plumbed" in affirmative defenses
and at sentencing, courts have been careful to preserve an initial
culpability determination by including a mens rea requirement as the
rule, rather than the exception, in the vast majority of criminal laws.247
E.

Net Widening

We may also insist on maintaining the status quo because
abandoning the traditional mens rea analysis will produce an
overwhelming number of claims from people with a range of
disabilities and other issues. This fear is not surprising. Any change
in criminal practice or procedure potentially resulting in leniency will
be subject to concerns about both floodgates and slippery slopes. If we
apply more scrutiny to mens rea for people with mental retardation,
for example, why not for those who act under the influence of drugs
or alcohol, or for those suffering from mental illness? Indeed, in some
jurisdictions, any of these conditions can serve as the basis for a
diminished capacity defense precisely because these conditions
compromise a person's thought processes.
Line drawing due to mental retardation, however, can limit this netwidening concern. Many jurisdictions preclude diminished capacity
defenses based on intoxication, and we could similarly draw a bright
line here to exclude people with what might be considered a selfimposed impairment.2 49 Another option is to distinguish between
246 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that Due Process Clause
requires conviction only upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary
to constitute crime charged).
247 See Staples v. United States, 511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) ("[T]he existence of a
mens rea is the rule of, rather than the exception to, the principles of Anglo-American
criminal jurisprudence."(alteration in original) (citation omitted)).
246 See, e.g., Robert C. Topp, A Concept of Diminished Responsibility for Canadian
Criminal Law, 33 U. TORONTO FAC. L. REv. 205, 213 (1975) (citing "fear that once the
proverbial floodgates are opened, the courts will be deluged" with such pleas of
diminished capacity).
249 See Morse, Diminished Rationality, supra note 209, at 300-01 (explaining that
"voluntary ingestion of mind-altering substances, including ethanol (alcohol), is
culpable" as opposed to a mental disorder, which is a "non-culpable" - and therefore
mitigating - condition). Of course, addiction experts would counter that alcoholism
or drug addiction is no more self-imposed than mental retardation or mental illness.
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mental retardation and mental illness, which is also fairly
commonplace in both the medical and legal communities. A mental
retardation diagnosis is multi-layered, hard to fake, and quite distinct
from one for mental illness, even as the two conditions may
commonly co-occur in the same individual. Tellingly, the common
fear that eliminating the death penalty for people with mental
retardation would result in a flood of petitions based on mental
retardation has not been borne out.25 0 To the contrary, not only have
courts been able to manage the claims, but a substantial number of
them have been valid. 5 '
F. What Would We Do if We Knew?
Perhaps the most cynical version of why we disregard the reduced
culpability of defendants with mental retardation is that we simply
lack a good alternative. If we determined, as we have with juveniles,
that people with mental retardation were, as a class, less culpable, we
would not have a particularly satisfying set of services or treatment
plans to accommodate them in lieu of a prison or jail sentence. Prisons
are inappropriate and dangerous placements for people with mental
retardation, particularly because they are subject to more disciplinary
infractions and abuse during incarceration. Moreover, rehabilitative
services for this population are even less common than treatment for
people with mental illnesses.25 ' But public mental hospitals, the most
See generally Alan I. Leshner, Addiction is a Brain Disease, and it Matters, 278 Sci. 45
(1997) (arguing that substance abuse is comparable to other chronic illnesses, with
scientific bases, explanations, and treatment indicators rather than simply a social or
moral problem).
250 See John H. Blume et al., An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and its
Application in Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 625, 628 (2009) (finding that "Atkins
has not opened floodgates of non-meritorious litigation," and noting that just 7% of
death row inmates have filed Atkins claims).
251 See id. at 628-29 (noting that "nearly forty percent of all defendants who allege
mental retardation have, in fact, proved it," a rate "substantially higher" than any
other typical post-conviction claim).
252 See Ellis
& Luckasson, supra note 4, at 479-80 (citation omitted)
(acknowledging that mentally retarded prisoners receive more disciplinary
infractions).
253 Bertram S. Brown & Thomas F. Courtless, The Mentally Retarded in Penal and
Correctional Institutions, 124 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1164, 1164, 1169 (1968); Ellis &
Luckasson, supra note 4, at 480 (citing United States v. Masthers, 539 F.2d 721, 729
n.56 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("[Pirisons provide few, if any, meaningful programs or services
for the retarded.")); Miles B. Santamour & Bernadette West, The Mentally Retarded
Offender: Presentationof the Facts and a Discussion of Issues, in THE RETARDED OFFENDER
7, 28-29 (Miles B. Santamour & Patricia S. Watson eds., 1982).
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secure alternative for people found not guilty by reason of insanity, are
Unlike mental illness, mental
often equally inappropriate. 5
retardation is not typically ameliorated with a regimen of

medications.2 5 5
Civil commitment to a state's system for "training and
rehabilitation" of people with mental retardation (as opposed to a
public mental hospital) is the only option for state-imposed measures
which can (even potentially) both protect the community and serve
the needs of this population. The public mental retardation system has
the advantage of targeting this population, rather than lumping them
in with people who have no intellectual disabilities or people with
mental illnesses. It also has a more appropriate theoretical basis. That
is, civil commitment is purportedly geared toward protecting the
safety of the community rather than imposing punishment for
blameworthy conduct."' It may be far from ideal to use the criminal
justice system as a funnel into such an impoverished mental health
services system, but at least it is a more appropriate forum to address a
population that lacks the consciousness, choice, and control to be
deemed criminally culpable. Ultimately, the justifications for the status
quo do not outweigh the need to re-think criminal law's treatment of
defendants with mental retardation. In the next Part, the article
presents three options for how the criminal system might deal with
254 Reid, supra note 107, at 21 (explaining that in mental hospitals, "treatment is
designed for the insane, not the retarded ... Because the treatments offered in mental
hospitals will have no effect, retarded persons end up warehoused indefinitely in
inappropriate settings").
255 The use of psychiatric medications among people with mental retardation is
widespread and controversial. See J.A. Nottestad & O.M. Linaker, Psychotropic Drug
Use among People with Intellectual Disability before and after Deinstitutionalization, 47 J.
INTELL. DISABILITY RES. 464, 464 (2003). People with mental retardation may also have
behavioral disorders, other mental illnesses, or maladaptive behaviors which may
respond to treatment with psychopharmacological interventions. See Peter Sturmey,
Diagnostic-Based Pharmacological Treatment of Behavior Disorders in Persons with
Developmental Disabilities: A Review and a Decision-Making Typology, 16 RES.
DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 235, 249 (1995). Literature addressing use and abuse of
such medication for people with mental retardation, however, provides no indication
that it will relieve all symptoms of the intellectual disability or increase IQ. See, e.g.,
William C. Torrey, Psychiatric Care of Adults with Developmental Disabilities and
Mental Illness in the Community, 29 COMMUNITY MENTAL HEALTH J. 471 (1993)
(indicating some appropriate uses of psychotropic medication for maladaptive
behaviors or psychiatric symptoms in people with mental retardation without
mentioning effect on IQ).
251 See Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 428 (1979) (contrasting purpose of civil
commitment proceeding "for the purpose of providing care" with "punitive" exercise
of state power in criminal proceeding).
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these defendants. However, only one of these options directly
addresses the problems created by the mens rea requirement.
V.

PROPOSALS

If we abandon the myth that a showing of mens rea indicates actual
culpability, we must re-think how the criminal law addresses adults
with mental retardation. We have three choices: First, change the
substantive law, so that mens rea requires a different, more specific
showing of state-of-mind for defendants with mental retardation.
Second, remove defendants with mental retardation from the
jurisdiction of adult criminal court and address their conduct through
a problem-solving court. Third, create a new doctrine that makes
mental retardation relevant to the question of culpability. As set forth
below, only the third option responds precisely to the prevailing myth
of mens rea without creating an overly complex infrastructure or
causing other untenable problems.
A. Change the Substantive Law
If the assumptions undergirding the use of mens rea as an indicia of
culpability are valid for people of average intelligence, perhaps we can
demonstrate that those assumptions are well-founded for a particular
individual with mental retardation. For example, we could change the
law of mens rea so that the government would bear the burden of
showing that a person charged with arson has a capacity to understand
his own actions, and social norms (consciousness); can make
thoughtful and independent decisions (choice); and can control his
conduct to a reasonable degree (control) - not just that he
"purposely" set a fire. We could call this "mens rea illustrated," since
it clarifies, rather than heightens, the usual narrow mens rea standard.
Demonstrating the existence of mens rea illustrated could occur in a
pretrial showing, out of the purview of the jury. If the government met
its burden, it would only need to meet the traditional mens rea
standard before the jury. But, if the government did not meet this
initial burden, it could not prosecute the case as charged.
Alternatively, the law could allow the jury to hear the expanded
evidence with regard to mens rea.
Homicide cases in California used to follow the mens rea illustrated
model where evidence was presented to the jury. To demonstrate the
"malice" necessary for a first-degree murder conviction, the State had
to show something akin to consciousness: that the defendant was
aware of an obligation to act within the general body of the law
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regulating society at the time of the offense.257 Further, "deliberation"
and "premeditation" - also required to prove a first-degree murder
charge - mandated a showing analogous to "choice": that "the
accused maturely and meaningfully reflect[ed] upon the gravity of his
contemplated act."21 8
This mens rea illustrated approach has multiple advantages. First
and foremost, it addresses the underlying culpability gap because only
those who were actually blameworthy would face criminalization for
their actions. The questions it seeks to answer are not wholly
unfamiliar to forensic experts. The "consciousness" and "control"
questions, for example, find analogies in the cognitive and volitional
prongs of the insanity test.2 59 This approach also treats people with
mental retardation as individuals, acknowledging that some function
at a much more sophisticated level than others. Because of this
variation in capacity, some individuals could and should be subject to
both the rewards and the challenges facing individuals without mental
retardation, a possibility which mens rea illustrated allows. For
developmental disability advocates, this so-called "dignity of risk," can
be a key element of achieving community integration and the ideal of
normalization.26 0 It means that a person with mental retardation can
both get her day in court and be treated as an accountable person.26 '
On the other hand, mens rea illustrated raises problems of evidence
and administration. First, there may be a difficult issue of proof, as
lawmakers or courts seek to establish precisely what constitutes
"consciousness," "choice," and "control," and whether each offense
needs to individuate those terms. Even as the common law might
eventually define these terms, demonstrating mens rea illustrated
seems like it would require a potentially expensive expert battle for
257 People v. Conley, 411 P.2d 911, 918 (Cal. 1966).

258People v. Wolff, 394 P.2d 959, 975 (Cal. 1964). However, as described above,
the California legislature subsequently repealed these provisions in the wake of the
Dan White case, narrowing the cognitive elements required for a first-degree murder
conviction. See Mendez, supra note 190, at 221 (describing change of murder law in
California after Dan White case, including unintended consequences of "simplifying"
state-of-mind elements).
25

See supra Part III.A.

Robert Perske, The Dignity of Risk, reprinted in WOLF WOLFENSBERGER, THE
PRINCIPLE OF NORMALIZATION IN HUMAN SERVICES 194, 194-95 (1972) (advocating
opportunities for people with mental retardation to take risks commensurate with
their functioning); see also WOLFENSBERGER, supra at 27 (arguing for "normalization,"
which urges maximum integration of people with mental retardation into conditions
and norms of mainstream society).
261 Some have pointed to a similar "dignitarian rationale" underlying the doctrine
of competency. See Bonnie, supra note 15, at 426-27.
260
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every case involving a defendant with mental retardation. To the
extent that the jury hears expert testimony about mens rea, there may
be concern that the expert(s) could inappropriately encroach on the
jury's role in determining the question of whether the defendant had
the requisite mens rea. Finally, mens rea illustrated disregards strict
liability offenses, such as statutory rape, which do not have a mens rea
requirement, but rely on a different set of assumptions for their
validity.2 62
Unfortunately, the mens rea illustrated option may be too complex
and expensive to administer across the board, especially for offenses as
insignificant as misdemeanors, which constitute the vast majority of
charges against people with mental retardation.263 In addition,
prosecutors, judges, and lawmakers may have insurmountable
political objections to the proposal, if charges (particularly serious
ones) are dismissed when prosecutors fail to demonstrate mens rea
illustrated. The backlash from the Harvey Milk/George Moscone
murder is a potent reminder of the political risk in excusing
apparently criminal conduct based on mental disabilities. 264
B.

Create an Alternative Court

A second proposal could require cases against defendants with
mental retardation to proceed in a different kind of forum or court.
The two nearest analogies in terms of alternative court systems are the
juvenile justice system and the so-called "problem-solving courts,"
such as mental health courts. While these courts are an appealing
alternative in some regards, the costs - in terms of dignity,
administration, infrastructure, and overbreadth/judicial philosophy make this an imprecise fit for the problems presented in this paper.
The analogy to juvenile court for this population is obvious, yet
placing people with mental retardation on a juvenile court docket is
very problematic. That is, despite their chronological age of
adulthood, people with mental retardation are often referred to by

262 See Nevins-Saunders, supra note 55, at 1081, 1113 (arguing that prosecutors
should have to prove assumptions underlying strict liability i.e., that defendant
understands both that people below certain age cannot legally consent to sexual
activity and that particular complainant was underage).
261 William 1. Gardner, Janice L. Graeber & Susan
J. Machkovitz, Treatment of
Offenders with Mental Retardation, in TREATMENT OF OFFENDERS WITH MENTAL
DISORDERS 329, 332 (Robert M. Wettstein ed., 1998).
2" See Part III.A.3 for more on the political aftermath of this notorious use of the
diminished capacity defense.
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their "mental age."265 They are also routinely infantilized by parents,
caregivers, and policymakers.26 6 It is, in part, this behavioral
comparison that has led to legal comparisons. Analogies between
children and adults with mental retardation have been made in areas
such as competence.6 7 and the death penalty.268 A natural extension of
this comparison might suggest that adult defendants with mental
retardation should be charged in juvenile court. After all, the juvenile
justice system is partly premised on the idea that young people are not
as blameworthy as adults. 69 Perhaps adults with mental retardation
should also be subjected to less punitive, less stigmatic, and more
limited,
rehabilitation-oriented
proceedings
with
greater
confidentiality and individualized treatment.
While this presents a compelling option, it ultimately fails on both
theoretical and practical grounds. First, there are significant
differences between people with mental retardation and juveniles. The
notion of rehabilitation that underlies a juvenile court system - that
young people can, with the proper supervision and services, reform
and outgrow any criminal impulses - is not quite the same for adults
with mental retardation. Indeed, while neuroscience research reveals
that juveniles typically outgrow the impulse control and risk-seeking
behaviors that make them less culpable than adults,2 70 there is no such
265A "mental age" technically means that a person has an IQ score equivalent to
what a typical person of a particular age might expect. Thus, an adult with a "mental
age" of seven scored what a typical seven-year-old would score on the same test.
Dorothy Griffiths, Sexuality and People Who Have Intellectual Disabilities, in A
COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO INTELLECTUAL & DEVELOPMENTAL DISABILITIES 573, 573 (Ivan
Brown & Maire Percy eds., 2007).
266 See Steven Reiss & Betsey A. Benson, Awareness of Negative Social Conditions
Among Mentally Retarded, Emotionally Disturbed Outpatients, 141 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 88,
88-89 (1984) ("Retarded people tend to be treated like children long after they
become adults.").
267 Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 417 (pointing to "the accepted analogy
between the presumed incapacity of children and mentally retarded adults to form
criminal intent").
268 See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 566-67, 575 (2005) (analogizing
diminished culpability of people with mental retardation to diminished culpability of
youth and finding analogy basis to constrain execution of individuals who committed
crimes before age eighteen).
269 The exceptions, of course, are juveniles who have been removed to adult court,
typically because they meet a certain age threshold and are charged with a sufficiently
serious offense. M.A. Bortner, TraditionalRhetoric, Organizational Realities: Remand of
Juveniles to Adult Court, 32 CRIME & DELINQ. 53, 54 (1986).
270 See ELIZABETH S. SCoTT & LAURENCE D. STEINBERG, RETHINKING JUVENILE JUSTICE
44-50 (2008); see also Mary Beckman, Crime, Culpability, and the Adolescent Brain, 305
Sa. 596, 596 (2004) (citing research that "the brain is still growing and maturing

2012]

Not Guilty as Charged

1477

predictable change in the brain of an adult with mental retardation;
they will never "outgrow" their condition.2 n People with mental
retardation can be trained to learn different skills and adaptive
behaviors, but their capacity for development is more limited than it is
for juveniles. The services and support necessary for this growth
would also be completely different than what the juvenile population
demands, exponentially expanding the range of services that courts
and pretrial service agencies would need to employ.
Of course, the primary objection to treating people with mental
retardation in juvenile court is that doing so this would infantilize and
degrade this class of adults. Notwithstanding the common use - even
in this Article - of the shorthand "mental age" of an adult with
mental retardation, the convention is not necessarily an apt reflection
of the individual's physical, emotional, and learning experiences."
Segregating people with mental retardation into a separate system
where they would enjoy fewer rights than other adult criminal
integration
unnecessarily
impinge
defendants27 3
could
efforts. "Accordingly, disability advocates would not likely support
such a proposal, and without their support, it would be nearly
impossible to achieve such a dramatic policy and legal change.
The other option, sending this population to an adult "problem
solving" court, overcomes the issue of infantilization, but raises other
concerns. Most significantly, the theory behind problem-solving
courts, such as drug or mental health courts, is that they solve "the
problem" allegedly underlying a person's criminality. Examples of
these allegedly criminogenic concerns include addiction or failure to
obtain mental health treatment." But even assuming that the theory
during adolescence, beginning its final push around 16 or 17," and continuing
maturation until age 20 or 25).
271 See supra notes 6, 160 and accompanying text (discussing permanency of
mental retardation diagnosis and limited possibilities for cognitive development).
272 See Griffiths, supra note 265, at 573.
27 While In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), made clear that juvenile defendants are
entitled to certain key procedural protections enjoyed by their adult counterparts,
there remain differences in the rights of juvenile versus adult defendants, such as
entitlement to a jury trial. See McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 544-45, 551
(1971) (acknowledging differences between adult and juvenile cases and denying
juveniles right to jury trial).
274 Garcia & Steele, supra note 18, at 841-43, 857-58 (rejecting use of juvenile
justice philosophy equating adults with mental retardation and children otherwise
completely segregates defendants with mental retardation from other adult
defendants).
275 Bruce Winick, Therapeutic Jurisprudence and Problem Solving Courts, 30
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1055, 1055 (2003).
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works for defendants in these other scenarios, how could one "solve"
the "problem" of mental retardation?2 76 With constant training,
management, or supervision, a person might learn, for instance, the
difference between appropriate (legal) and inappropriate (illegal)
sexual conduct.2 7 7 However, that growth is not certain, and such a
lesson would need to be, like a mental retardation diagnosis, virtually
lifelong - an impractical and expensive proposition likely to exceed
the bounds of due process. 78
To the extent that specialty courts have addressed the needs of
defendants with mental retardation, they have done so in conjunction
with mental health courts.2 79 This is risky because people with mental
retardation often fare poorly when lumped together with people with
mental illnesses. Their treatment regimes, providers, behaviors, and
outcomes differ from people with mental illnesses.2"o Further, the
relatively small population of those with mental retardation
(compared to those with mental illnesses) sometimes mean that their
particular issues are not addressed when they are competing for the
services and expertise of limited providers.2 8 1
Aside from dignity and administration issues, the principal problem
with forum-based solutions is access. A specialty court promises
repeat players and institutions, which means that a small set of judges,
experts, and attorneys are likely to rotate through the court,
developing useful knowledge and services more attuned to a particular
population. But even assuming they become as widespread as other
276 Cf. PRESIDENT'S NEW FREEDOM COMM'N ON MENTAL HEALTH, ACHIEVING THE
PROMISE: TRANSFORMING MENTAL HEALTH CARE IN AM. 1 (2003), available at
(noting
that
http://store.samhsa.gov/shin/content//SMAO3-3831/SMAO3-3831.pdf
"recovery from mental illness is now a real possibility").
277 AINSWORTH & BAKER, supra note 90, at 97-103, 115-17 (emphasizing importance
of sex education for this population).
278 See MONAT, supra note 108, at 28 (noting that process of sex education for even
mildly mentally retarded adults "will take longer, need to be more concrete, and be a
repetitive system of delivery of information").
279 See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
280 See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 423-25.
281 As explained in note 9, the number of people in prison and jail with mental
retardation is unknown, but one survey of state and federal prison administrators
reported that approximately 4.2% of their inmates were mentally retarded, and an
additional 10.2% learning disabilities. Undisputedly, the number with mental illnesses
is far greater. The Bureau of Justice Statistics has said 60% of jail inmates showed
symptoms of a mental health disorder, followed by 49% of state prisoners and 40% of
and federal prisoners. DORISJ. JAMES & LAUREN E. GLAZE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SPECIAL
REPORT: MENTAL HEALTH PROBLEMS OF PRISON AND JAIL INMATES 1 (2006), available at
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf.
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problem-solving courts, these "mental retardation" dockets are
unlikely to reach many defendants, particularly those in smaller
jurisdictions; based solely on geography, significant numbers of people
with mental retardation would still have no policy or doctrinal relief
for their unjust criminalization.
C.

Flip the Presumption

The final option for dealing with defendants with mental retardation
is flipping the mens rea presumption. If the problem with prosecuting
defendants with mental retardation is the misplaced presumption of
their culpability, then the most appropriate response may be a
presumption that tilts in the opposite direction. That is, we should
assume that this class of defendants cannot really be culpable and,
therefore, cannot fulfill the requisite element of mens rea. As a
consequence, charges against these defendants should be
presumptively dismissed. Such a solution may be perceived as
overbroad and unduly insensitive to disregarding another primary
purpose of criminal law: public safety. Accordingly, prosecutors and
courts could adopt a bifurcated response based on the dangerousness
of the offense instead of relieving all defendants with mental
retardation from all criminal liability.
Under a two-tiered approach, the presumption against culpability
would apply only to those charged with nonviolent offenses.28 2 Under
certain circumstances related to public safety, the government could
overcome the presumption and proceed even in non-violent cases, as
detailed below. For the most serious offenses, however, the individual
could be tried and convicted as usual.283 However, the sentence would
be limited to the least restrictive means necessary to secure the safety
of the community. While such an approach is not a perfectly titrated
response to the diminished culpability problem for this population, it
282 The actual fault line between the two types of offenses is likely to become a
controversial political or judicial question, and I leave to others the task of making
finer distinctions than the rough "violent non-violent" divide I have offered here. See,
e.g., Jeff Bellin, Crime Severity Distinctions and the Fourth Amendment: Reassessing
Reasonableness in a Changing World, 97 IowA L. REV. 1, 22-34 (2011) (proposing
strategy for classifying offenses into categories of severity in the context of the Fourth
Amendment). Nonetheless, I draw this line recognizing that the presumption of nonculpability runs across all offenses. Accordingly, any countervailing argument must be
both legitimate and narrowly tailored. If public safety is the justification for
disregarding the lack of culpability among defendants with mental retardation, it
should be at issue only in cases where a real threat to safety (i.e., violence) is alleged.
183 In such cases, mental disability would remain a mitigating factor. See Penry v.
Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 328 (1989).
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balances concerns about convicting and punishing morally blameless
individuals against concerns about public safety.1 4 This proposal also
makes the most sense politically, administratively, and theoretically.
Procedurally, cases applying the 2-tier system would depend on a
mix of cabined discretion and bright line rules. The bright line rules
delineate to whom the doctrine would apply (defendants with mental
retardation, unless the legislature or local rules expanded the target
population), and for what offenses (violent versus non-violent).
Beyond these baseline points, discretion, such as what would
constitute a least restrictive penalty consistent with an explicit
sentencing goal, would come into play. Some cases involving
defendants with mental retardation who may not be truly culpable are
already informally managed through prosecutorial charging decisions
in the first place. 85 This proposal would mandate that prosecutors
engage in a more formalized, holistic approach to every case with a
defendant reasonably known or suspected to have mental retardation.
Where some indication exists that the individual may not have acted
but for his mental retardation or may otherwise have been impaired
due to his cognitive disability, the Government would act on its own
to dismiss or decline to prosecute a case. To effectively make this
determination, prosecutor offices would need to develop teams that
specialize in mental retardation.286 Building this expertise is one way
to ensure that the power of prosecutorial discretion is wielded
effectively.
Resting with prosecutorial discretion, however, is far from a perfect
solution, given the contrary incentives prosecutors face to assign
blame and secure convictions. 287 To counteract this possibility and to
284 For instance, the proposal would not even presumptively dismiss the arson
defendant. mentioned throughout this paper, given that the offense raises
countervailing public safety concerns.
285 Scholars have acknowledged the phenomenon of courts using discretion
to
address mental retardation where doctrinal tools are not available. See Donald HJ.
Hermann, Howard Singer & Mary Roberts, Sentencing of the Mentally Retarded
Criminal Defendant, 41 ARK. L. REv. 765, 789-90 (citing cases supporting claim that
judges mitigate post-trial sentences for defendants who are willing to plead guilty but
are "de facto incompeten[t]" to do so and, therefore, would otherwise miss out on
sentencing benefit of guilty plea); see also sources cited supra notes 9, 10 (showing
other examples of parties using (and failing to use) discretion to address differences
related to mental retardation that legal doctrine fails to account for).
286 In smaller jurisdictions, such teams could be available regionally for
consult
with more dispersed or smaller offices.
287 See Smith, supra note 31, at 153 n.106 (quoting U.S. Department of Justice
policy of seeking to charge and convict defendant of most serious offense, as well as
maximum supportable sentence).
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accommodate the real possibility that defense counsel may be the first
to recognize a defendant's intellectual disability, judges could also
entertain a defendant's motion to dismiss based on mental retardation.
As with questions of competency, such a motion, if contested, could
invoke a pretrial hearing.288 Beyond establishing a person's diagnosis,
the court could also entertain the government's argument for
overcoming the presumptive dismissal.
To provide some structure for the court's decision (and to provide a
framework for prosecutors considering discretionary decisions in
these cases), courts could weigh a number of enumerated factors
similar to those relevant under the Bail Reform Act for pretrial
release.
Considerations relating to a defendant's culpability and the
need to begin or continue a prosecution could include: (1) community
ties and support; (2) rehabilitative or supervisory programs in place;
(3) nature and severity of cognitive disability and co-occurrence of
other disabilities; (4) nature of the offense (particularly considering
the alleged role of the defendant and his relationship to other parties
involved); and (5) defendant's criminal history.
Assuming the Government has not decided sua sponte to forego
prosecution, the defendant would have the burden to prove his mental
retardation by a preponderance of the evidence. However, the burden
to prove that the case should go forward, notwithstanding the relative
insignificance of the charge, would fall on the prosecution. In other
words, the presumption is that, where the defendant has mental
retardation and the offense is nonviolent, the case will be dismissed.
There are a number of reasons that this bifurcated approach is the
most appropriate resolution to the problems this Article discusses.
First, and most obviously, this approach provides a comprehensive
legal acknowledgment that a person's mental retardation may affect
his criminality, even if it does not occur on the extremes of insanity or
incompetency. Moreover, unlike sentencing, bifurcation addresses
culpability at the front end of the criminal process, rather than
presuming culpability with a criminal conviction and merely seeking
to mitigate harm after the fact (and after the trauma of a trial) through
a sentencing reduction.2 90 This solution provides the missing doctrinal

288 It is also possible that a culpability and competency hearing could be combined
into one proceeding.
28
See 18 U.S.C. § 3142(g) (2008). The Bail Reform Act ("BRA"), however, is
hardly a perfect substitute for a more thoughtful list which is more closely tailored to
the individual and his mental capacity than the very broad public safety concerns
upon which the BRA focuses.
290 Much like competency, the issue of a person's mental retardation
(and the
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hook that leads to the perversions of justice for people with mental
retardation in the criminal justice system.
The proposal is also feasible. It would gain the support of advocates
for people with mental retardation, who commonly seek human
dignity and integration into the cultural mainstream.9 Unlike a
juvenile court add-on or an absolute rule precluding criminal liability
for individuals with mental retardation, it does not infantilize; rather,
it preserves some "dignity of risk," without overstating the capacities
or culpability of a vulnerable population."' At the same time, it
explicitly addresses public safety concerns, making it much more
politically palatable to prosecutors, legislators, and other law
enforcement-oriented policy-makers.
Administratively, the plan would be easier to implement than mens
rea illustrated or developing an alternative court system. At its worst,
the proposed system could engender a clash of experts over the
diagnosis of mental retardation that would trigger its application. But,
as noted in Part IV, assigning a bifurcated system lowers the stakes for
the parties in most cases and, presumably, their thirst for battle.
Bifurcation is also consistent with sentencing justifications for
people with mental retardation, including retributivism, deterrence,
rehabilitation, and incapacitation.2 93 First, there is no retributive
justification for punishing people who are not culpable. A fortiori,
they do not deserve punishment.2 94 Second, prosecuting and
sentencing people with mental retardation will not deter crime. As the
Supreme Court stated in Atkins, these individuals are highly unlikely
according protections this proposal would offer him or her) could be raised at any
point in the process, by any party with knowledge of the defendant's condition.
291 See WOLFENSBERGER, supra note 260, at 45 (citing "maximal integration ... into
the societal mainstream" as "one of the major corollaries of the principle of
normalization" for people with mental retardation and noting that "[o]ne major
paradigm is to obtain services from generic agencies which serve the general public,"
rather than physically and socially segregating people with mental retardation into
their own service providers).
292 See Denno, supra note 139, at 359 (articulating principle that there is no
"dignity" in treating people with mental retardation "as though they possess capacities
that they do not in fact have").
293 See PAUL H. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL l.AW: CASE STUDIES & CONTROVERSIES 87-91 (2d
ed. 2008) (explaining four primary purposes of punishment).
294 A retributivist theory of punishment has also been called a theory of "just
deserts": "the retributive ideal" is that "offenders should suffer in proportion to their
moral desert." Mary Sigler, Just Deserts, Prison Rape, and the Pleasing Fiction of
Guideline Sentencing, 38 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 561, 565 (2006). Thus, to the extent that there is
no moral blameworthiness on the part of defendants with mental retardation, there
should be no punishment based on retribution.
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to have the cognitive capacity to perform the cost-benefit risk analysis
that underlies any effective deterrence-based strategy."' Third,
rehabilitation, another fundamental theory of punishment, is possible
for people with mental retardation. As noted with regard to problemsolving courts, these individuals can be taught, educated, and trained,
within certain limits. So it is conceivable that they could obtain
support and services that would minimize the risk of future
offenses.296 However, such rehabilitation would need to be specialized
and ongoing to be effective since mental retardation is a persistent,
lifelong condition.297 The high-level services necessary to such
improvement are very unlikely to be available in a prison context.9
In most circumstances, then, we are left with incapacitation as the
final justification for punishment. To the extent that a person is so
violent that she poses a threat to the community, some might argue
that culpability is irrelevant and that any distinctions based on mental
capacity are insignificant. Despite the very real possibility that a
person lacks blameworthiness, imposing criminal prosecution and,
potentially, penalties, should not be taken lightly. Yet, allowing
prosecutions to proceed in such instances is an acknowledgment of
political reality and public safety.
Given the severity of consequences underlying the incapacitation
justification, however, particularly for defendants with mental
retardation (who routinely suffer more during incarceration than their
counterparts of average intelligence), any criminal proceeding and
subsequent sentence based on incapacitation should occur under the
least restrictive means necessary to ensure the safety of the

2.. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S 304, 320 (2002). Not imposing criminal liability on
defendants with mental retardation is also unlikely to deter criminal conduct of those
who do not have mental retardation, as people of average intelligence would only
assess their risk based on similarly situated individuals (i.e., those without mental
retardation). Id.
29. See Ellis & Luckasson, supra note 4, at 477 n.353 (citing R.L. Harbach, An
Overview of RehabilitationAlternatives, in REHABILITATION AND THE RETARDED OFFENDER
122, 132-35 (P. Browning ed., 1976) ("[C]ommunity treatment centers reveal that
community based corrections can serve as a practical alternative to conventional

imprisonment.")).
297 See supra notes 6, 162 and accompanying text (discussing permanency of
mental retardation diagnosis and limited possibilities for cognitive development).
298 This kind of programming is very unlikely to occur in any meaningful way in a

prison setting, as correctional facilities have limited rehabilitative services and
programs targeting people with mental retardation are virtually nonexistent. See Joan

Petersilia, PrisonerReentry: Public Safety and Reintegration Challenges, 81 PRISON J. 360,
361 (2001) ("[T he corrections system retains few rehabilitation programs").
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community.2 99 Supervision in a group home or placement in a secure
mental health facility with appropriate habilitation services, for
instance, may appropriately serve to incapacitate a defendant with
mental retardation, without subjecting him or her to particularly
inhumane treatment in a prison.
In some sense, this proposal, too, may be an overbroad response. It
does not directly address the individual's culpability in a particular
case. But as a response to what I have argued is an over-inclusive mens
rea standard for more serious offenses, this proposal begins to reset
the balance. Moreover, any overbreadth could compensate for the
many other ways that a person's mental retardation affects her
criminal outcomes in disproportionately negative ways.300
CONCLUSION

Culpability makes criminal law a moral venture, rather than simply
a regulatory scheme. It is simply unjust to punish people who are not
blameworthy. Criminal law, like Holmes's poor dog, has
acknowledged the difference that intention makes.30 ' Accordingly,
virtually all criminal cases require some form of culpability, a
requirement typically imposed through the mens rea element. We can
make this association between culpability and mens rea only because
we presume that defendants have certain baseline capacities, to wit: an
awareness of social and legal norms (and of their own conduct); an
ability to reflect and make independent decisions about whether to
comply with those norms; and an ability to execute those decisions
thoughtfully, or otherwise restrain untoward impulses.
For defendants with mental retardation, however, the assumption
that they have these underlying capacities is simply inapt. Decades of
psychosocial research on this population demonstrate that members of
this group do not have the consciousness, choice, and control that
imbue a finding of mens rea with culpability. While scientists are just
beginning to plumb the depths of neuroimaging information, this
research tool also has begun to reveal evidence that these individuals
are less culpable than people with average intelligence.

See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
See Atkins, 536 U.S. at 320-21 (noting "special risk of wrongful execution" for
defendants with mental retardation because of increased likelihood of compelled
confessions, diminished ability to assist counsel, difficulty serving as credible
witnesses, etc.).
301 See HOLMES, supra note 33, at 3.
299

300
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The fact that people with mental retardation are different from other
criminal defendants has not gone totally unnoticed by criminal law.
But frequently there is no doctrinal support for the introduction of
evidence regarding this difference. This is particularly true outside the
very porous sieves of the insanity, competency, and diminished
capacity doctrines. Lacking viable alternatives, defendants may be
compelled to take unorthodox measures to have courts consider the
truly relevant information about their intellectual disabilities. While
sentencing can remedy some of the doctrinal concerns related to
people with mental retardation, there is no justifiable reason that a
vulnerable population of defendants should have to be put through a
traumatic process - especially one which wrongfully presumes their
blameworthiness, convicts them, and saddles them with collateral
consequences - just to have that conviction later "mitigated."
This Article proposes a solution that meets this doctrinal problem at
its source. By flipping the inaccurate presumption of culpability
attending the element of mens rea, it seeks to reverse the overbroad
criminalization of people with mental retardation. While the flip
enables us to dismiss nonviolent charges against this class of
defendants, political and administrative concerns beg for a different
result for those charged with violent offenses. In these more serious
cases, defendants might be subject to normal criminal proceedings,
but at least their sentences would be narrowly tailored to the least
restrictive alternative to satisfy an express theory of punishment - a
standard which does not typically apply to criminal dispositions.
It may seem like a radical proposal to presumptively dismiss a
criminal case simply due to a person's diagnosis or mental health
condition. But, given the research on people with mental retardation,
and our theoretical and doctrinal tradition of holding only
blameworthy people criminally accountable, it is the status quo that
seems radical. We cannot refer to mens rea as a bedrock of criminal
law if it fails so completely this population of defendants.
It is safe to say that a number of defendants - those with mental
illness, head injuries, drug addictions, or even just irrational moments
due to grief or trauma - might similarly believe that mens rea fails to
adequately capture their culpability (or, more likely, lack thereof).
Advocates for these populations may, therefore, seek to avail
themselves of a doctrine that presumptively dismisses non-violent
cases against their clients. Not all of these individuals are similarly
situated, however. Those with brain injuries incurred in adulthood,
for instance, may resemble people with mental retardation in every
regard but for the fact that the onset of their condition occurred after
age eighteen. At first blush, there would certainly seem to be no
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principled reason for treating members of the two groups differently.
But more work will need to be done to assess whether the
psychosocial and/or neurological evidence bears out this analogy.
Even if it does, there may be political, administrative, or even
theoretical differences that justify differential treatment for different
classes of defendants.
In the end, we may question whether our current mens rea doctrine
is an appropriate measure for a sufficiently large number of defendants
to serve as the default rule. But whether we revise the doctrine in
general or create additional carve-outs, it is critical not to charge,
convict, or sentence defendants with mental retardation for offenses
for which they are not truly culpable.

